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Abstract 
Next Generation networks (3G and beyond) are evolving towards  all  IP 
based systems with the aim to provide global coverage. For Mobility in IP 
based networks, Mobile IPv6 is considered as a standard by both industry 
and research community, but this mobility protocol has some reliability 
issues. There are a number of elements that can interrupt the 
communication between Mobile Node (MN) and Corresponding Node 
(CN), however the scope of this research is limited to the following issues 
only: 
•  Reliability of Mobility Protocol  
•  Home Agent Management  
•  Handovers 
•  Path failures between MN and CN 
First entity that can disrupt Mobile IPv6 based communication is the 
Mobility Anchor point i tself,  i .e.  Home Agent. Reliability of Home Agent 
is addressed first  because if this mobility agent is not reliable there would 
be no reliability of mobile communication. Next scenario where mobile 
communication can get disrupted is created by MN itself and it  is due to 
its mobility. When a MN moves around, at some point it  will  be out of 
range of its active base station and at the same time it  may enter the 
coverage area of another base station. In such a situation, the MN should 
perform a handover, which is a very slow process. This handover delay is 
reduced by introducing a “make before break” style handover in IP 
network. Another situation in which the Mobile IPv6 based 
communication can fail  is when there is a path failure between MN  and 
CN. This situation can be addressed by utilizing multiple interfaces of MN 
at the same time. One such protocol which can utilize multiple interfaces 
is SHIM6 but it  was not designed to work on mobile node. It was designed 
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for core networks but after some modification in the protocol , it  can be 
deployed on mobile nodes.  
In this thesis,  these issues related to reliability of IPv6 based mobile 
communication have been addressed.  
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Chapter 1 
 
 
1  Introduction 
 
The goal of cellular mobility standards has always been to provide global 
connectivity without involving network layer. General packet Radio 
Service (GPRS), Wideband Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA) and 
Universal Mobile Telephony System (UMTS) are thr ee standards that 
provide Link layer mobility. Access to IP networks in case of Link layer 
mobility is through one specific router.  This feature of link layer mobility 
causes problems such as inefficient routing or triangular routing. This and 
many other problems associated with Link layer mobility can be resolved 
by using Network layer mobility.   
Next Generation networks (3G and beyond) are evolving towards all  IP 
based system where the aim is to provide global ubiquitous coverage.  
Major 3G standardization bodies such as 3GPP and 3GPP2 are adopting 
IETF‟s protocols i .e.  Mobile IP (MIP) and SIP for supporting various 
service scenarios. These services include VoIP, online gaming, white 
boards and video conferencing. Wireless communications is a fast growing 
area. Recent addition to the family of wireless technologies is WiMAX 
which offers metropolitan scale wireless broadband with support for 
mobility. Every new technology opens new research issues. With many 
competitive options in wireless family, the conten t providers are left  with 
more liberty in terms of selection of a particular technology for delivery 
of services to the users.  
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Consider a scenario in which there are multiple access technologies such 
as WiFi, WiMax and 3G Networks. In this situation, mobi le users would 
like to freely move across different technologies without experiencing 
interruptions in connectivity.  One possible solution to this problem is 
proposed in authors‟ research papers [1], [2]. These papers provide 
mechanisms which can be used to roam freely across heterogeneous 
networks. However, providing mobility in heterogeneous networks is not 
the end of story. Next step is making this IP based mobility reliable 
enough to match the Teleco requirement of five nines [66]. The aim of this 
research is to achieve this goal.  
There are many challenges associated with providing a reliable Mobility 
service in IP based networks. These challenges are described later in this 
chapter but first  mobility protocol is introduced.  
1.1 Mobility Protocol 
In MIPv6, a Mobile Node is always expected to be reachable by its Home 
Address whether it  is attached to home link or some foreign link. This 
Home Address is an IP address assigned to mobile node with prefix that is 
advertised on its home link. When Mobile  Node is located on the  Home 
link, it  can receive packets on its assigned Home address. While in foreign 
network, it  is also addressable at a care -of address. Care-of address is an 
IP address associated with a mobile node that has a subnet prefix from 
some foreign network. The association between a mobile node‟s home 
address and care-of address is known as "binding". While away from home 
network, a mobile node registers its primary care -of address with a router 
on its home link, requesting this router to f unction as the "home agent". 
The mobile node performs this binding registration by sending a 
"Registration Request" message to the home agent.  The home agent 
replies with a "Binding Acknowledgement" message. Any other nodes 
communicating with mobile node are referred to as "correspondent nodes".  
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Mobile nodes can provide information about their current location to 
correspondent nodes and home agent, using CoTI/CoT, HoTI/HoT 
Messages.  The procedure is known as return rout ability test. It  is 
performed between the mobile node, home agent, and the correspondent 
node in order to authorize the establishment of binding. Packets between  
mobile node and correspondent node are either tunneled via the home 
agent, or sent directly if a binding exists in the correspo ndent node for 
current location of the mobile node. Mobile IPv6 tunnels payload packets 
between mobile node and home agent in both directions.  This tunneling 
uses IPv6 encapsulation. Where these tunnels need to be secured, they are 
replaced by IPSec tunnels.  
A generic scenario of mobility is il lustrated in Figure 1.1. This figure is 
explained as under.  
Home Link:  The network link that is assigned Home  subnet prefix. From 
this home prefix MN obtains its Home Address.  
Home Address :  The address assigned to the MN when it is attached to 
Home Link and through which MN is always reachable regardless of i ts 
location on internet.  
Home Agent:  I t  is a router on Home link that maintains all the 
registrations of MNs which are away from their home link.  This agent 
receives all  the data destined for HoA. 
Mobile Node:  This is IPv6 enabled node which can change its point of 
attachment to internet.   
Foreign Link:  Any link that is not a Home link for MN is called foreign 
link. 
Care of Address:  This is an IPv6 address which is temporary and changes 
with MN‟s point of attachment to internet.  
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Corresponding Node:  Any IPv6 node which can communicate with MN.  
Home Subnet Prefix:  The IP subnet identity that corresponds to home 
address.  
Foreign Subnet Prefix:  Any IP subnet identity that is not Home subnet 
prefix.  
 
Figure 1 .1:  Generic  Mobil ity  Scenario  
 
Home Registration:  The registration of MN‟s CoA with Home agent on 
Home link.  
Binding Update:  The message sent by MN to notify Home agent regarding 
any change in its CoA 
Binding Acknowledgement :  The message sent by HA to acknowledge 
Home registration.  
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Mobile Prefix Solicitation:   This message is sent by MN to HA to request 
its Home Link prefix which can be used for obtaining HoA  
Mobile Prefix Advertisement:    This message is sent by HA at inform 
MN about the home link prefix.  
1.2 Research Challenges 
In this section, the research challenges associated with communication 
reliability in of mobile environments are discussed.  
Reliability of Mobility Protocol  
 
Mobile IPv6 is a well -designed protocol but one of its shortcomings is  its 
reliability. The protocol mechanism itself makes the mobility agent a very 
critical point.  A HA can serve multiple MNs. If a HA crashes, 
communication to all MNs which is routed through that HA will get 
disrupted. This makes HA a single point of failure.  This problem has been 
realized by IETF and is still  under discussion in MEXT working group.   
Home Agent Management  
 
In future, it  is anticipated that there would be a large scale deployment of 
mobile nodes which would require multiple HAs. In such a scenario, there 
is a need for an adequate management framework for HA. There is no 
existing mechanism that defines such a framework.  
Fast and Secure Handovers  
 
When mobile node moves, at some point the mobile node will  reach the 
physical border of its current wireless network and will enter an area 
covered by another wireless network. In such a situation, mobile node 
must switch to the new wireless network. This switching is called 
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handover. This handover process is very slow in base MIPv6. Fast 
handover for MIPv6 (FMIPv6) has been developed as an extension 
protocol to reduce the handover latency and packet loss inherent with  
MIPv6. The RFC for FMIPv6 is categorized as “Experimental” by IETF 
because it  is not in compliance with MIPv6 standard. One major 
compliance issue is that MIPv6 standard requires that all the messages 
exchanged between MN and HA should be secured which in  case of 
FMIPv6 are not.  In addition to this,  FMIPv6 handovers are based on 
anticipation which is not very accurate and can result  in failed handover.  
Communication Path Reliability  
 
A common scenario is when two mobile devices are communicating via 
MIPv6. To increase the reliability of this communication path there is a 
need to introduce redundancies. One approach is to make use of all  the 
available interfaces of mobile device. A research challenge to this 
approach is how to detect path failures and how t o switch interfaces. 
There is no existing mechanism to quickly detect path failures and switch 
interfaces in mobile environment.  
1.3 Contributions 
The contributions of this thesis are:  
 A novel HA reliability architecture is proposed which can 
quickly detect failures and perform HA assignment and HA load 
sharing. The mechanism is based on a central controller called 
HA Manager. Failure detection is performed by listening to 
periodic heartbeat messages for HA. These heartbeat messages 
are L2 frames with embedded higher layer information related to 
specific HA. Based on this embedded information HA load 
sharing can be performed. Since this load sharing is based on 
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feedback mechanism, it  outperforms existing solutions. The 
architecture also proposes a failure recovery scheme which is 
based on modified mobile node registration with HA. Overall , 
the proposed solution increases the reliability of HA. This 
research is part of FP6 project,  ENABLE [3] and this 
architecture was considers as an early stage solution.  
 A new framework for HA management is proposed which can 
perform self-healing, self-configuration and self -optimization. 
This proposal is based on IBM‟s vision of autonomic computing. 
This framework also proposes a new data delivery mechanism 
based on L2 frames. By using L2 frames, the monitoring data can 
be delivered quicker without affecting network performance.  
 FMIPv6 is modified to make it compliant with MIPv6 RFC. This 
modification includes addition of new procedures which makes 
the protocol secure without affecting its performance. For 
verification of the procedures, the actual testbed is build at 
Brunel University. This research is part of FP6 project and the 
testbed was presented in final demonstration meeting of the 
project.  
 A new improved handover anticipation mechanism for FMIPv6 is 
proposed. Under certain test condition the success rate of 
anticipation ranges from 30% to 35% in case of standard 
FMIPv6. After modification, under similar test conditions this 
success rate is increased to 60%. This new antic ipation is based 
on prediction of MN‟s trajectory.  
 A new mechanism for communication path redundancy is 
proposed. This scheme is based on modification of Reach Ability 
Protocol (REAP) which was designed for failure detections in 
core networks. After some modifications, it  can be used on 
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Mobile Node. This scheme involves communication path failure 
detection and recovery mechanism. The mechanism allows a 
prominent multi-homing benefit  i .e.  reliability to be realized by 
quickly detecting failures in the path b etween MN and CN and 
recovering from them. It  is shown that the proposed scheme out - 
performs existing MIPv6 failure detection and recovery 
techniques.  
 
1.4 Thesis Outline 
This thesis consists of six chapters and covers the research work 
motivated by the challenges outlined in section 1.2. Each chapter has its  
own introduction, related work, proposed scheme, results and conclusions.  
The thesis has been organised as follows:  
In Chapter 2  a new architecture for HA reliability is proposed. Generally, 
reliabil ity schemes introduce redundant HA to the network. In the 
proposed scheme there are no redundant HAs. This is achieved by 
introducing a new HA registration scheme which allows MN to get 
registered with two HAs. In addition to this,  a new HA failure detecti on 
scheme based on L2 frames is introduced. This L2 frames is embedded 
with higher layer information. With this approach more detailed 
information can be transported over the network without generating 
significant traffic. This failure detection scheme can  detect the failure in 
less than 40ms. In addition to this,  the proposed architecture also 
evaluates three possible load sharing schemes. In the results section of 
this chapter the failure detection and load sharing schemes are compared 
with existing solut ions. 
 Chapter 3  presents a framework for HA Management based on 
Autonomic Computing concepts. By introducing this scheme, HA system 
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would be able to monitor itself and perform self -healing and self-
optimization. This chapter also presents a review of some  commonly used 
schemes in industry for server/service monitoring. Some modules of the 
proposed scheme are simulated in NS2 and the results are presented in this 
chapter. At the end of this chapter, a generalized solution is developed 
which can  be used to perform autonomic management of different 
network services.  
In Chapter 4  modifications to FMIPv6 is presented. These modifications 
include addition of security during handovers and improvement of 
handover anticipation. The handovers are secured by exchange  of 
authentication keys. MN requests the authentication key from network 
before initiating a handover. Once the key is acquired, it  is presented to 
the new access router during handover procedure. Next the access router 
checks the validity of this key. If the key is validated,  MN is allowed to 
use the network. This scheme is validated through actual testbed 
implementation. In the results section, the performance of secure -FMIPv6 
is compared with non-secure version of FMIPv6. In addition to this,  a new 
handover anticipation scheme is presented to assist  FMIPv6 in access 
point selection. This scheme is based on prediction of MN‟s trajectory 
based on its previous three locations. In the results sections this scheme is 
compared with standard FMIPv6 procedures.   
Chapter 5  presents a mechanism that adds redundancies to the 
communication path between MN and CN. The link failure detection is 
based on modification of REAP protocol which was originally designed 
for core networks. If there is a failure on active link the communication 
switches to the redundant link.  For switching from one interface to 
another, MN sends a binding update message to HA. This binding update 
message contains the CoA associated with the interface to which it  desires 
to switch. In the result s section this scheme is compared with standard 
MIPv6 interface switching.  
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Finally, the summary of the thesis‟ contribution along with the scope of 
future research directions are presented in Chapter 6 .  
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Chapter 2 
 
 
2  Reliability of Mobility Protocol  
 
It  is anticipated that next generation networks will  be all  IP based. For 
Mobility in IP networks MIPv6 is considered as the prime protocol. MIPv6 
is a very well designed, well implemented and very flexible protocol. 
However, it  has some deficiencies. One of the main issues overlooked 
during its design is reliability. The protocol mechanism makes mobility 
agent a very critical element. This chapter focuses on improving the 
reliability of mob ility protocol by making this “single point of failure” 
more reliable. This research is part of FP6 project ENABLE.  
2.1 Introduction 
Mobile IP (MIPv6) is originally defined in [4] as an extension to IPv4 for 
mobility support.  The evolution of MIPv6 from MIPv4 solved the 
problems of triangular routing and ingress filtering. In addition to this, 
the new protocol introduced built -in route optimization, multiple HAs 
support and IP security. With time and discussions on mailing -lists,  
original draft of MIPv6 [5] is standardized in RFC 3775 [6]. Today, 
MIPv6 is the most mature and widely accepted protocol for mobility 
support in IPv6 networks.  
In MIPv6 each Mobile Node (MN) is identified by its home address (HoA) 
regardless of i ts current point of attachment to the In ternet. When  MN is 
away from its home network, a temporary address called care of address 
(CoA) is assigned to it .  While away from its home network, MN sends a 
registration request to HA which informs HA about MNs current location 
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on Internet.  HA stores this information in a table called binding table. HA 
also advertises its own link-layer address for HoA of MN. Thus, all 
packets sent to HoA are received by the HA which are then tunneled to 
MNs current location using its CoA.  
An HA can serve multiple MNs. If  HA crashes, communication to all  
MNs which is routed through that HA will get disrupted. This makes HA a 
single point of failure. According to MIPv6 protocol MN can only 
discover failure of HA in following two scenarios.  
I . When MN moves from its current location to a new location and 
sends BU to the failed HA and does not received a corresponding 
BA. In this situation, MN will retransmit BU until t imeout expires. 
At this point MN will  detect failure of HA  
II.  When Global IP address prefix of an HA expires, MN  sends a 
Mobile Proxy Solicitation message to HA. If MN does not receive 
Mobile Proxy Advertisement then MN will  retransmit this message 
until  timeout expires. At this point HA failure will  be detected.  
According to MIPv6, MN after sending first BU or Mobi le Proxy 
Solicitation message to the failed HA, will  wait for an initial timeout 
which is set to 1 second in case of BU and 3 seconds in case of Mobile 
Proxy Solicitation. This timeout period will be doubled for each 
subsequent BU or Mobile Proxy Solicitat ion message until  the max time of 
32 seconds is reached. This causes MN to send 6 BUs or 5 Mobile Proxy 
Solicitation to the failed HA before the final t imeout occurs.  
So the total failure detection time in case of MIPv6 is,  
Detection time (base on BU timeout) = 1+2+4+8+16+32 = 63 seconds  
This detection of failure causes significant delay. In addition to this,  BU 
or Mobile Proxy Solicitation messages are not periodic message. MN will 
send BU only if it  has to register a new CoA or when current registration 
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expires. Similarly MN will  send Mobile Proxy Solicitation message only 
when its serving HA address is about to become invalid. Once the failure 
of HA is detected, it  must perform Dynamic Home Agent Address 
Discovery (DHAAD) to find another suitable home age nt on home link. 
MN will  suffer a significant packet loss before regaining connectivity if 
MIPv6 standard failure detection and recovery procedures are employed. 
To increase the reliability of HA, there is a need for more sophisticated 
failure detection scheme. Later in this chapter a novel HA failure 
detection scheme is proposed which can detect HA failures within 40ms 
without introducing significant network traffic.  
In addition to failure detection, another issue in an HA deployment is fair 
load sharing. MIPv6 allows the deployment of multiple Home agents in 
the network. In the Next Generation of Networks (NGN), it  is expected 
that there will  be a huge number of MNs supporting MIPv6. With large 
number of MNs, multiple HAs are required which presents the pr oblem of 
fair load distribution. There is a crude load sharing scheme in MIPv6 
which is based on anycast addressing. In this scheme it is assumed that all 
HAs have same load handling capabilities. It  is a sort of round robin 
scheme which cannot guarantee fair load sharing. Anycast addresses may 
allow a router to pick different anycast destinations for every packet but 
this does not mean that load will  be shared fairly between the HAs. 
Another major problem in this scheme is that it  does not provide any 
administrative control.  In this chapter, a novel scheme for load sharing is 
presented which can guarantee fair load distribution among HAs.  
To increase the reliability of MN‟s communication, the reliability of HA 
must be increased. This can be achieved by addi ng redundancy to HA 
setup. In case of multiple HAs, simple one -to-one redundancy is not a cost 
effective solution. Ideally, in a situation where there is failure of a single 
HA in a group, the remaining HAs should be able to take over.  
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 This chapter presents a solution that will  enable us to quickly detect and 
recover from failures. Along with this quick recovery mechanism, the 
proposed solution can perform a fair load sharing.  
In the remaining part of the chapter, an intensive review of existing HA 
reliability solutions is presented. Subsequently, a detailed architecture of 
proposed solution is presented. Finally some test results are presented 
along with chapter summary.  
2.2 Evaluation of Existing HA Reliability Approaches  
In the research community different  solutions for HA reliability have been 
developed but the most promising ones are outlined and assessed in this 
section. 
2.2.1  HA Redundancy Protocol  
This scheme [7], known as “Home Agent Redundancy Protocol” (HARP), 
is an extension to Mobile IP for providing Ho me Agent redundancy. In 
HARP, one or more HARP peers act as a single shared Home Agent. In 
every HARP peer the neighboring HARP peers information is stored. Each 
peer forwards any Mobile IP registration messages it  receives to its peers 
via “HARP udp Forward” message. This allows  peers to share registration 
information. In addition to this,  when one HA boots or recovers from any 
failure, it  can retrieve the complete registration information from another 
peer.  
HARP peers are multi -homed in a sense that they  have two IP addresses. 
The HARP peer address is used for peer communication, e.g. the exchange 
of binding information; the "Mobile-IP subnet" address is used as HA 
address known by MNs. HARP peers are located in different networks but 
they are within the same routing domain and intra -domain routing 
protocols like OSPF and RIPv2 are running on the network. Both HARP 
peers announce the same Mobile IP home prefix. Depending on the routing 
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metric, Mobile IP packets are routed to either peer. In case of a HA 
failure, the failing HA will not announce the prefix anymore and OSPF or 
RIP will change routes towards the available HAs.  
 
 
GW
R
HA2
CN
R
HA1
 
Figure 2 .1:  HA Redundancy Protocol  
 
This protocol was designed for MIPv4 and it  does not take into 
consideration IPSec SAs established between MN and HA, but for a 
transparent failover the IPSec states have to be shared as well.  Hence, it  
cannot be used for MIPv6 enabled networks without major modifications.  
2.2.2  Fault Tolerant Mobile IP 
In [8] a solution for HA reliability is presented.  MN sends a registration 
request to HA1, which then forwards it to HA2 for binding 
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synchronization. HA2 acknowledges this by sending a BA to HA1. After 
this,  HA1 sends a BA to MN.  In case of HA1 failure, HA2 performs 
gratuitous ARP to take over the failed HA1. In the gratuitous ARP process 
a host informs other hosts of a new MAC address by sending ARP 
message. The document does not specify the mechanism used for HA 
failure detection itself.  Once HA1 returns after a crash, it  asserts i tself 
through gratuitous ARP and takes back its previous IP address and 
contacts HA2 to obtain its mobility binding.  
GW
HA1 HA2
CN
 
Figure 2 .2:  Fault  Tolerant Mobile IP  
This scheme does not discuss IPSec SAs between MNs and HAs. It 
synchronizes the binding tables between HAs but not IPSec SA states so 
there would be no seamless switchover possible.  It  uses gratuitous ARP 
to replace a failed  HA. This is a slow process and as a result  mobile 
clients would suffer from service interruption.  
2.2.3  Efficient Fault-Tolerant Protocol for Mobility Agents in Mobile 
IP 
This scheme is presented in [9]. It introduces a “stable storage”. 
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Registration process which involves logging binding information to a 
stable storage before sending BA to MN. In case of failure, the least 
loaded HA takes over the failed HA using gratuitous ARP and reads the 
stable storage. Failures are detected by not receiving RAs from the HA s.  
This scheme does not discuss the synchronization of IPSec SAs, 
established between MNs and HAs. It  has no fair load sharing scheme and 
delayed failure detection. It  introduces a novel idea of stable storage but 
it  uses gratuitous ARP which is a slow pr ocess.  
2.2.4  HA Redundancy in Mobile IP  
This proposal was presented in [10]. This scheme is based on having 
Standby and Active HAs, the selection of which is beyond the scope of the 
scheme. Active HA is responsible for registering MNW and synchronizing 
binding information with Standby HAs. Thus binding cache is 
synchronized on Active and Standby HAs. Standby HA is responsible to 
download the binding cache from the Active HA either before it  takes over 
the Standby HA role or immediately after becoming a Standby H A. 
Multiple Standby HAs per Active HA are supported by this scheme. 
Messages exchanged between HAs are secured. This draft only provides 
the scheme for redundancy. It  does not suggest any scheme for failure 
detection.  
This scheme does not define a way to s elect Active /  Standby HAs. Failure 
detection is also not tackled in this scheme.  Hence, from ENABLE‟s 
perspective it is not a complete scheme.  
2.2.5  Local HA to HA protocol  
The proposed protocol was presented in [11] and it  is for communication 
between HAs. Each HA maintains a list of home agents on the home link 
by listening to RAs, in which H bit  is set to 1, indicating that i t  is a HA. 
Failure detection is based on Hello messages, sent by each HA 
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periodically. Binding cache is synchronized by all  HAs. The H A which 
actually processes the MN registrations is considered as primary HA of 
that specific MN. Each HA is supposed to broadcast BU messages 
whenever it  processes and updates its binding cache due to a MN 
registration request.  HA can query any other HA fo r information regarding 
a particular MN binding. The primary HA can send  Home Agent Switch 
Request message to ask a MN to switch from one HA to another. In case 
of failure of the primary HA, the backup HA can send Home Agent Switch 
Request message to all  the MNs that are registered at the failing HA. The 
Home Agent Switch Request message must be secured via IPSec ESP in 
transport mode. If there is no existing  IPSec SA between  backup HA and  
MN, the HA must negotiate an IPSec SA first .  
This protocol introduces “HA switch” concept which gives service 
providers the flexibility to request MN to switch to another HA. This 
approach is similar to Hard Switch mode of [HAREL]; however, the 
establishment of IPSec SAs between MN and backup HA during 
bootstrapping is  not mandatory. Hence, the IPSec SA negotiation in 
failure case would add delay to the switch over process.  
2.2.6  Introducing Reliability and Load Balancing in Mobile IPv6 
based Networks 
The reliable HA service offered by [12] is a “Virtual HA Reliability 
Protocol” which achieves this service by introducing the concept of a 
Virtual HA. In essence in VHARP, each HA has a unique link -local IP 
address but all  the HAs have the same global IP address known as “Global 
HA address”. This Global HA address is resolved onl y to one of the 
multiple HAs on the home link. This HA is the owner of the Global HA 
address and it  is known as the Active HA. MN‟s and CN‟s are only aware 
of the Global HA address, which is considered  HA address by MNs  
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Figure 2 .3:  Single  Virtual  HA view of  mult iple  HA's in VHARP  
For state synchronization, VHARP introduces the concept of operating 
states for HA. In VHARP all HAs attached to home link do not operate 
equally. Each HA operates in one of three states, namely Active HA, 
Backup HA or Inactive HA.  
In this scheme there can be only one HA acting as “active HA” on the 
home link at a given time. For synchronization VHARP uses more than 
one HA for storing registrations of a MN. Binding Synchronization is 
done over the network; however, no details are given about this 
synchronization process. VHARP modifies the MIPv6 binding cache 
originally defined in RFC3775 [6], with some new fields.  These are 
“Binding Owners List”, “Number of Binding Owners” and “Lo ad”. After 
successful binding synchronization, the active HA performs IPSec 
synchronization by multicasting the IPSec to all other HAs. However, no 
details of this synchronization are given.  
Failure detection is achieved by means of a heart beat message, w hich 
utilizes a modified router advertisements (RAs) that is multi casted by 
each HA at a constant rate on the home link. In case of a HA failure, a 
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backup HA can provide service to the MN in a transparent way, as VHARP 
requires that for each MN there is a t least two HAs holding its Binding in 
their Binding Cache. These HAs are known as the “Binding Owners” for 
the MN.  
This scheme looks promising but there is no optimal mechanism defined 
for HA failure detection. The scheme relies on modified router 
advertisements, which is a slow process. Furthermore, there are no details 
given for synchronization process of bindings and IPSec SAs..  
2.2.7  Virtual Router Redundancy Protocol  
This approach is outlined in [13]. It  is not strictly an HA reliability 
mechanism, but a protocol to provide virtual router functionality. 
However this could be applied to HA reliability due to the fact that two or 
more HAs in a HA redundancy set could have one set as the master route r 
and the others as backup router(s),  creating a virtual HA towards MN.  
In VRRP, responsibilities of virtual router are assigned dynamically to 
one of the VRRP routers on LAN. The master router is the one that  
controls the IP addresses associated with the  virtual router functionality. 
It  also forwards packets sent to these IP addresses.  
The main advantage of using VRRP is that fast switching to a Standby HA 
in an event of failure of the Active HA can be achieved. However, this 
approach does not consider a t all  the fact that the routers are running 
MIPv6; consequently there is neither binding cache synchronization nor 
IPSec synchronization specified in this approach. It  must also be 
highlighted that for this protocol to work all  HAs should be on a single 
subnet. 
2.2.8  Home Agent Reliability Protocol  
This approach is outlined in an Internet Draft of the IETF HA reliability 
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design team [14].  In this draft there are two different HA network 
configurations for standby HAs. Either all  the HAs serving the same home 
network are located on the same link or standby HAs are located on a 
different link (named the recovery link).  
Once a HA network configuration is chosen there are two possible 
redundancy modes, a Virtual Switch mode and a Hard Switch mode  
Home Agent Virtual Switch mode: Home Agent Virtual Switch mode is 
transparent to the MNs. In this approach the Active and Standby HA share 
a virtual home agent address and perform synchronization of binding 
cache, AAA and IPSec information between them. The failure of the 
Active HA is detected by the Standby HA e.g. via a HA Hello message 
mechanism. Once the failure is detected, the Standby HA activates the 
virtual home agent address and starts immediately to act as Active HA. 
This is completely transparent to the MNs registe red at the failed HA. 
Home Agent Hard switch mode: Home Agent Hard Switch mode is not 
transparent to MNs. In this approach the Active HA and Standby HA have 
separate HA addresses, both maintain an IPSec SA with MNs, and the 
active HA synchronizes the requi red states, such as the binding cache and 
AAA information, with other standby HAs periodically. When a failure of 
the Active HA is discovered by a Standby HA, the Standby HA will use 
the pre-existing IPSec SA to notify the MN that there is a failure of i ts  
current Active HA via a HA Switch Message. Upon receipt of this HA 
Switch Message the MN sends a BU to Standby HA, which will  in turn 
update the MIPv6 tunnel end points.  
[14] Also allows for Active HA management. In the case where the Active 
HA may need to stop serving MN‟s due to system maintenance. This 
specification provides for an administrator triggered HA switch between 
an Active and Standby HA by using the Switchback Request and Reply 
messages.  
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This approach is already relatively mature and provides  mechanisms for 
failure detection, state synchronization, and HA switching. Moreover, the 
approach provides the flexibility for the provider to choose either the 
Virtual or the Hard switch mode, both having advantages and drawbacks. 
Finally, being developed by the IETF HA reliability design team, this 
approach is l ikely to become standardized.  
The solutions discussed in sections 2.2.1 –  2.2.7 have deficiencies either 
regarding delayed failure detection, service interruption, or the non -
availability of mechanism details,  e.g. how to perform IPSec state 
synchronization.  
The approach developed by the IETF HA reliability design team [14] has 
the flexibility to support both Hard Switch and Virtual Switch mode. 
Based on service provider preference, either of them can be deployed. 
Furthermore, the level of details in the specification is already advanced 
and, since the IETF is following this approach, it  has most potential to 
become standardized.  
Our proposed solution is different from above -mentioned approaches. Aim 
of this research is to make HA more reliable but at the same time not 
introduce any redundancies.  In contrast to the  solutions listed, in our 
proposed solution there is no redundant HA. All the HAs have active 
registrations and in case of single HA fai lure, remaining active HAs can 
act as backup HAs.  This very nature of the scheme makes it cost effective 
solution. 
 
2.3 HA Reliability Architecture  
This section presents the proposed architecture for HA reliability. For this 
scheme to work a central controll er known as the HA Manager is required 
that can detect HA failures and perform HA load sharing and assignment. 
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For this architecture, i t  is assumed that Mobility is a premium service and 
needs to be authorized by the Mobility Service Provider (MSP).  
 
 
Figure 2 .4:  Typical HA deployment Scenario  
If an MN is switched on in its home network, it  does not require any HA 
and all  the packets addressed to the MN on its HoA are routed directly to 
the MN. If the MN is switched on in a foreign network and is successfully 
authorized with Access Service Provider (ASP) then the next step would 
be to authorize its mobility service. For authorization, proposed protocols 
are either Diameter or Radius protocol. If mobility se rvice authorization is 
successful,  MSP AAA will  send IP addresses of two HAs that can be used 
by MN. In a situation where MSP and ASP are the same, the whole 
process can be completed in one phase. In this case, mobility service will 
be authorized during the authorization request for network access.  
HA Registration:  
Once the mobility service is authorized, MN will  send a modified 
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registration request to both HAs whose IP addresses are received from 
authorization server. In each registration request,  MN will  include IP 
addresses of both HAs. In registration request,  first  IP address represents 
primary HA for that MN and second IP address represents secondary HA. 
After completion of HA registration, MN will  have two HAs, one primary 
and the other secondary. Using these procedures for HA registration, both 
HAs will  know that for a particular MN there are two HAs  
Failure Detection and Recovery:  
In case of HA failure, i t  will be detected by HA manager in under 40ms. 
Once the failure is detected, HA manager will  mul t icast “HA Failure” 
(HAF) message. It  is assumed that all  HAs are located on a single link, so 
multicasting is the most efficient way to broadcast this HAF message. 
Once this HAF message is received by HAs, they will  check their binding 
table and look for MNs whose primary HA has failed and for which they 
are acting as secondary HA. Once all  the MNs are identified, HAs will  
start sending HA switch message to those MNs.  
HA Switching: 
Once HA switch message is received by MN, it  will  switch its primary and 
secondary HA and communication can be resumed on the new primary HA.  
HA Load sharing and load redistribution:  
As part of failure detection process which is explained in the next section, 
each HA sends some higher level information to HA manager in a Layer 2 
frame. This information includes number of active registrations and traffic 
throughput. HA manager stores this information in a table which is 
consulted for fair load distribution. Using this table, HA Manager knows 
the number of registrations on each HA and last 10 seconds average traffic 
value on their interface. Once HA Manager knows the number of 
registrations on each HA and traffic through each HA, it can decide the 
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least loaded HA based on developed cost function described in the 
following section. Load sharing mechanism starts with discovery / 
assignment of HA IP address.  When HA IP address is assigned during 
mobility service authorization by Mobility Service Provider (MSP), AAA 
server will  send additional attribute called HA -Address. Before sending 
the HA-Address attribute, AAA would check the next preferred HA with 
HA Manager using SNMP or a simple SQL query.  
Load redistribution after the initialization stage is required in situations 
where an HA recovers from a failure or MNs suffering from a te mporary 
connection loss in particular locality. Such a situation can result  in un -fair 
load distribution. To resolve this issue, load redistribution among the HAs 
is required. It  could be carried out by sending re -registration request to 
MNs that are using an overloaded HA as their primary HA. The IP address 
of a preferred HA could be included in the re -registration request.  Upon 
receiving this request,  the MN would send BU to new  HA. Trigger for 
load redistribution procedure could be the detection of sign ificant 
difference of load between different HAs. The MN whose HA will be re -
assigned can be selected in accordance with certain criteria that may be 
developed based on the applications running on the MN and their QoS 
requirement etc.  
2.3.1  Composition of the HA redundancy set  
 
For economical reasons it makes no sense to have a one -to-one 
redundancy for all HAs. With separate dedicated backup HAs for all 
active HAs, the reliability solution could be realized as pure hardware 
backup and would not require any soft ware-based backup mechanism. 
Therefore, for the proposed scheme a design assumption is that each HA 
needs to serve as backup for multiple HAs.  
In an operational network it is reasonable to assume that HAs are all 
placed within a secure environment so it  is  not necessary to secure any 
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control protocol used between them. When HAs are in a secure 
environment, they can be located on single link. So in this scheme, it  is 
assumed that all  HAs are located on a single link. This allows us to use 
multicasting. With these design assumptions, we calculate the reliability 
of an HA deployment.  
Let the random variable X represent the lifetime or the time to failure of 
an HA. The probability that HA survives until time t  is called reliability 
R(t) of the component.  
Thus  
 
Where F is the distribution function of the HA lifetime, X. The HA is 
assumed to be working properly at time t=0 and no HA can 
work forever without failure  .  
Consider a fixed number of identical HAs, ,  under test. After time t, 
 HAs have failed and  have survived with .  The 
estimated probability of survival may be written as:  
 
In the limit as  we expect   to approach  .  As the 
test progresses,  gets smaller and  decreases:  
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The total number of components  is constant,  while the number of failed 
components  increases with time. Taking derivatives on both sides of the 
above equation, we get:  
 
Where  is HA failure rate. Therefore, as  the right hand side 
of this equation may be interpreted as the negative of the failure density 
function,  
 
Consider an HA deployment of n HAs with denoting the lifetime of HA 
 denoting the lifetime of HA system.  
Then 
 
 
This implies that the reliability of an HA system is more than a single HA. 
Now calculating expected life of the system or the mean time to failure.  
 
 
Now if the  is an exponentially distributed function with parameter  
then 
 
And  
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Let   ;  then .   
Thus 
 
As above is sum of finite geometric series:  
 
 
 
Note that  
 
Thus, the MTTF of HA system with redundant HA is give by  
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Figure 2 .5:  MTTF vs.  number of  redundant HAs  
Figure 2.5 shows the expected life of an HA system as the function of n. It 
should be noted that beyond n=3 or 4, the gain in expected life is not very 
significant.  Also the rate of increase in MTTF is .  
This reliability model for HA system is accurate with the key assumption 
that if there is a failure of single HA, M N can switch the other HAs and 
this switching is 100% successful.   Because of this assumption, it  is not a 
very realistic model. In some cases it  may not be possible to switch to a 
backup HA resulting in  failure of recovery procedure. These failure are 
classified as un-recoverable and the probability that a given failure 
belongs to this class is denoted by ,  where c denotes the probability 
of occurrence of recoverable failures and this is known as coverage 
parameter. Here is the mathematical model for such a system. 
Let  denote the lifetime of an HA system with two HAs, one active and 
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the other backup. The failure rate of an active HA is .  It  is assumed that 
backup does not fail.  Let  be the indicator of failure class; this is  
  if failure is un-recoverable 
  if failure is recoverable  
 
Then 
 
 
To calculate the MTTF of such system, the conditional expectation of  
give  by noting that if a unrecoverable failure occurs the mean life of the 
system equals the mean life of the initially active HA. That is  
 
 
And if a recoverable failure occurs, then mean life of the system is the 
sum of mean lives of two HAs.  
 
Now total expectation of the system is  
 
Thus when , the backup HA does not contribute to system reliability 
and when , the expectancy of the system is affected.  
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Given that failure was recovered ( ) the system l ifetime, ,  is the sum 
of two independent exponentially distributed variables, each with 
parameter .  Thus the conditional probability distribution function of  
given  is two-stage Erlang density.  
 
 
If an unrecoverable failure occurs, lifetime  is simply the lifetime of 
initially active HA. Therefore  
 
Now the joint density is computed by  as 
 
 
And the marginal density of  is computed by summing over the joint 
density:  
 
Therefore the reliability of the system is give by  
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Figure 2 .6:  Reliabil ity vs.  coverage parameter  
 
Figure 2.6 shows  as a function of T for various values of coverage 
parameter.  
Typically, the reliability of a system (any piece of software or hardware 
equipment) is expressed in terms of its availability (A).   
.
t
t
A a                                       (2)  
The formula states that the availability of a system is the percentage of 
time when the system is operational (i .e. the  ratio between the time during 
which the system is available t a  and the total time t).  The other two 
important parameters for availability are MTBF and MTTR. Mean Time 
between Failures (MTBF), as the name suggests, is the average time 
between failures estimated by the manufacturer of a piece of equipment. 
The average time between failing and the return to service is termed Mean 
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Time to Repair (MTTR). In an operational system, however, repair 
generally means replacing the hardware module, thus MTTR could be 
viewed as mean time to replace a failed hardware module . It  must be noted 
that the lower the MTTR requirement, the higher the operational costs for 
the operator.  
Availability can be expressed in terms of MTBF and MTTR by the formula 
given below. 
MTTRMTBF
MTBF
A
                             
(3) 
Availability is typically specified in nines notation. For example 3 -nines 
availability corresponds to 99.9% availability. 5 -nines availability 
corresponds to 99.999% availability.  
Like software and hardware equipment, the best way to describe the 
degree of reliability of a service is through the concept of availability.  
MTTRMTBD
MTBD
A                         (4) 
Where MTBD is the Mean Time between disservices. Assuming that the 
mobility service is only dependent on the correct operation of the HAs.  
 
In more similpfied terms, r eliabilty is define as the ability of a system or 
component to perform its required functions under stated conditions for a 
specified period of time.  Normally it is calculated in percentage of a 
system uptime (when its working properly) to total time. In case of HA 
agent it  would be 
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    (5) 
Where  
 
 = Time when HA is working properly  
 
= Time when HA was not working properly.  
 
 can be further split  into two parts.   
 
 
    (6) 
 
Where  
 = failure Detection time 
And  
= HA Recovey time 
 
In most HA reliability mechanisms, emphasis is on second part of 
equation 6, which is the recovery time and first  part is left  un -touched. 
This proposed scheme presents a solution where overall  HA down time is 
significantly decreased by reducing both failu re detection time and 
recovery time, but main focus is on failure detection time. A novel load 
sharing scheme for HAs is also included.  
The solution proposed for reliability is described in two parts.  First,  new 
radical failure detection scheme based on c ross layer design is discussed 
and then actual reliability scheme is described.  
2.3.2  HA Manager  
In the proposed scheme, HA Manager would maintain a table called 
“Service Table”. This table would contain three records. First  record for 
HA address, second record  for its bandwidth utilization and third record 
would be active binding on that HA. This table would be populated by 
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heartbeat messages received from different HAs. Data from this table 
would  also be available to other entities on the network.  
Another function of this HA Manager is to perform HA failure detection 
and initiation of recovery procedures which is explained in the next 
section. 
2.3.3  HA Failure Detection  
In this scheme, HA Manager has been introduced to the network. As the 
name suggests, it  would be  responsible for monitoring HAs. In proposed 
scheme, all  HAs will  send a heartbeat message to the HA Manager. When 
HA Manager receives this message, it  will  analyze the data payload and 
will  update its service table. If three consecutive heartbeats are not  
received by HA Manager for a particular host,  i t  is  declared to be failed. 
This scheme is not quite different from the current practice but the 
novelty is within the message that is being sent. Heartbeat message would 
be based on layer 2 and will  carry h igher layer information in its payload. 
Since this scheme is based on layer 2, the interval of this heartbeat 
message can be greatly reduced without adding significant load to the 
network. Simulation results shows that we can easily reduce this interval 
below 10 ms but for this research, aim is to detect failure within 40 ms 
and for this 10 ms is enough.  
Typical Deployment scenario is presented in Figure 2.7. In this Figure 
there are three HAs labeled as HA1, HA2 and HA3 which are monitored 
by HA Manager.  
Procedures for scheme are as following:  
 HA would send L2 frames to HA Manager at the rate of 100 
frames/sec 
 These L2 frames are generated by a thread of service daemon. In 
this case, HA daemon would be responsible to generate the Frames.  
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 HA Manager would process the frames and update its service table 
based on the information available in frames.  
 If three consecutive frames from any particular node are missing, 
either the node or the service that is monitored will  be declared 
failed. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 .7:  HA deployment Scenario  
Packet Format:  
The structure of this periodic heartbeat message is critical.  If the packets 
are huge, they cannot be sent frequently as they would generate excessive 
load on network. If packet size is small, it  cannot carry enough 
information. To address this problem, a radical approach based on cross -
layer design is adopted. Application layer encoded information is 
embedded in payload of  L2 frame.  This unique method would resolve the 
dilemma by keeping the packet size small and still  carrying enough 
information.  
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Figure 2.8 presents the actual packet structure that is used for heartbeat 
messages. The frame is designed to have the capability of using IPv4 and 
IPv6 transport mechanism if requir ed. This frame can carry eight different 
parameters related to a single HA. For evaluation of the scheme, only two 
parameters are considered. 16 bits are assigned for each parameter. In the 
parameters section of packet, first  16 bits represents number of a ctive 
registrations on HA and next 16 bit  represent the bandwidth consumption 
is kilobits.  Other possible parameters could be CPU utilization, RAM 
utilization, available disk space etc.  
 
 
Figure 2 .8:  Packet  Format 
From this packet structure it is very clear that detailed information is 
being sent by HA utilizing very small bandwidth. If fact it  used about 74 
bytes or 592 bits.  This frame  supports up to eight different parameters.  
In this frames, 256 bits are  left  blank which can be used by either IPv6 or 
IPv4 header. In situations where different HA are across different VLANs 
or different subnets, an IP transport scheme is required. Normally IP 
transport scheme is avoided to reduce load on network routers. Ne twork 
Routers are usually slow as compared to Network Switches. If a single HA 
is sending 100 packets per second it  will  not affect routers in anyways but 
consider a situation in which there are ten HAs and each is  sending 100 
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packets per second. In this case, routers need to process 1000 packets per 
second. This may affect performance of some small routers. To avoid such 
a situation it  is preferred to use L2 frames and thus it  will  only engage 
network switches which are not be affected by this extra load.  
To meet the requirements [66] of commercial telecom network of five nine 
i .e.  99.999% error/failures detection process should be quick. In our 
actual testbed, failure detection time was less than 40ms while utilizing 
network capacity by only 0.01 percent.  Details of testing are mentioned in 
result  section.  
2.3.4  Modified Binding Update  
A modified binding update procedures is proposed for this architecture. In 
this scheme, MN will  register itself with atleast two HAs. One is primary 
HA and other is secondary HA.  While sending binding update message to 
either of HA, IP address of both primary and secondary HAs should be 
included. This will  make HA aware of MN‟s association with any other 
HA. 
 
Figure 2 .9:  Modif ied Binding Update Message Header  
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2.3.5  Switching the HA at the MN 
If there is a failure of primary HA for a certain MN, then its secondary 
HA will  be able to request MN to switch its primary HA. This is 
performed via HA switch message. This message can optionally car ry IP 
address of HA. 
 
Figure 2 .10:  HA Switch Message Header  
In case of failure of the primary HA for a certain MN, the secondary HA 
will  send the HA switch message to MN. Once this message is received by 
MN, the secondary HA will become its primary HA and a registration 
request would be sent to the HA whose IP address is include in HA switch 
message. This new HA would become the new secondary HA.  
2.3.6  HA loadsharing 
This module is responsible for sharing load fair ly between different HAs. 
In MIPv6 environment, dynamic HA allocation is not a feasible solution 
because if the assigned HA is switched frequently, it  will  create disruption 
in MN‟s communication. The switching process involves sending HA 
switch message, HA de-registration request,  followed by de -registration 
acknowledgement, sending BU to the new HA and waiting for BA. 
Assuming the end-to-end delay from HA to MN is X  milliseconds, then 
the switching time can calculated as follow.  
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This  ranges from 1-3 seconds because of de-registration and 
registration process which involves HoA link -address removal from one 
HA and its advertisement on another HA.  
Since frequent HA switching is not feasible, the load sharing must be 
performed during HA assignment phase. The variables that are considered 
during the assignment phase are number of MNs registrations, traffic 
throughput and the load-handling capacity. With these variables there are  
three possible approaches for HA load sharing; first,  based on number of 
registrations, second, based on traffic throughput and the third based on 
load-handling capability of HA.  .  Three different approaches have been 
explored and simulated. Simulations were run in MATLAB. First approach 
tries to equalize the number of registration on all HAs. Second approach 
tries to equalize the network traffic through each HA. Third approach tries 
to equalize the load handling capability of each HA. This load handling 
capability is calculated based of following cost function.  
 
100
TmxRmx
TcrRcrTmxRmx
LCHA
     (7)
 
Where 
LCHA= Remaining Load handling capacity  
Rmx = Maximum Registrations  
Tmx = Maximum Throughput  
Rcr = Current Registrations  
Tcr = Current Throughput  
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This cost function is simulated in MATLAB and was test for fairness.  
Advantage of load sharing based on this cost function is that it  can be 
deployed for HAs  having different load handling capabilities. For the 
first  two approaches, load handling capabilities of HAs must be the same.   
2.4 Operational scenarios for HA reliability  
Consider a scenario of Figure 2.7. In this scenario , there are three HAs 
and a single HA Manager. Consider a situation where an MN is registered 
with HA1 and HA2. HA1 is the primary HA for this MN and HA2 is 
secondary HA. If there is failure of HA1, HA manager will detect i t  and 
declare that HA1 has failed by sending a HAF message on HA multicast 
address. Once this message is received by MN‟s secondary HA, it will 
send HA switch message to MN. This process is presented with help of a 
signaling diagram of Figure 2.11.  
 
 
Figure 2 .11:  Typical  HA Failure  
Chapter 3         HA Management  
_____________________________________________________________  
43 
 
As illustrated in this signaling diagram, MN registers with two HAs. The 
failure of HA is detected by HA Manager which then multicasts HAF 
message. When this HAF message is received by HA2, it  send HA Switch 
message to MN. 
MN Registration:   The proposed scheme suggested a modified 
registration processes which would enable MN to get registered with two 
HAs.  
Failure Detection:  Let‟s consider the situation where MN1 has 
primary HA namely, HA1 and secondary HA HA2.  Now if there is a 
failure of HA1 after time T, it  will  be detected by HA Manager. Once this 
failure is verified, HA Manager multicasts HAF message, on HAs 
multicast address indicating failure of a specific HA.  
Recovery Procedure:  Once HAF message is received by  HA, it  will  
check if i t  is acting  as secondary HA for any MN whose primary HA has 
failed. If it  finds one, it  will send HA switch message with IP address of 
HA3. Once this message is received by MN1, it will  discard its current 
primary HA and will  nominate its secondary HA as its new prim ary HA. 
After this,  MN1 will  send a new registration request to HA3 using the 
modified Registration request message. This modified registration 
message will  include IP address of HA2. Once the registration is 
completed, HA3 would know that i t  is acting as secondary HA for MN1. In 
this way MN1 can quickly recover from HA failure. Once this process is 
completed, MN1 would stil l  have a primary HA and a secondary HA.  
In a situation, were there is failure of both primary and secondary HAs for 
a particular MN, the procedure  would not be able to recover from it .  
2.5 Scheme Verification 
For the verification of proposed scheme, it  is simulated in two parts.  First  
the failure detection system is simulated and then load distribution 
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schemes  is simulated. For failure dete ction scheme, Network Simulator 2 
(NS2) is used. For load distribution scheme, MATLAB is used as 
simulation tool.  
2.5.1  Failure Detection Scheme 
The proposed failure detection scheme is simulated in NS2. Different 
aspects for recovery scheme including failure de tection time, effect of this 
scheme on network applications and its bandwidth utilization, are studied. 
The scenario developed in NS2 is shown in Figure 2.12. 
In the figure there are three nodes. Node 0 is HA manager, Node 1 is HA 
and Node 2 represents a test node. In simulation run,  HA was sending L2 
frames to HA manager every 10ms. Test node ca n request both CBR and 
UBR data from HA.  
 
 
Figure 2 .12:  NS-2 Test  Scenario Screenshot  
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For simulation, L2 frame with length of 74 bytes or 592 bits is created. 
Nodes were connected through a 100Mbit/sec Loca l Area Network (LAN) 
using IEEE 802.3 standard. Network latency was set to 4ms. This 4ms 
latency is a very huge delay in term of today‟s standards. These days 
different venders provide Ethernet switches with latency of 3 -4 micro 
seconds. Examples are Cisco  Nexus 7000 Series switches which can 
handle 480 million packets per second. Selection of 4ms was to study the 
effect of failure detection scheme is worst possible case.  
2.5.1.1  Failure Detection time  
 
Failure detection is based on missing three consecutive fram es. HA will 
send L2 frames to HA Manager at rate of 100 frames/sec. HA Manager 
will  process the frames and update the table based on the information 
available in frames. If three consecutive frames from any particular node 
are missing, either the node or t he service that is monitored has failed. 
This theory was tested in NS2 and the results are presented and compared 
with MIPv6 [5], VHAHA [11] and VHARP [12] in Figure 2.13.  In MIPv6, 
the failure detection time is around 63 seconds.  In VHARP the failure 
detection time is about 3.2-3.5 seconds (data was sourced from [12]).  In  
VHAHA the failure detection time is 4.2 -4.8 seconds (data was sources 
from [11]).  In contrast,  the proposed scheme was able to detect the failure 
within 40ms. This faster failure detec ted is possible because of the new 
radical approach to detect failures with the help if L2 frames rather than 
L3. 
For testing, HA failure is simulated (Node 1 in figure 2.12) by stopping 
the transmission of L2 frames. This was detected by HA manager and 
reported in nam file. This process is repeated about 20 times to calculate 
average failure detection time. The recorded time was between 34ms and 
46ms. In theory this detection time should vary between 30ms and 40ms 
but because of network latency and end to end delay the actual variation is 
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between 34ms and 46ms. In comparison to exiting solutions, the proposed 
scheme provides far superior performance.  
 
Figure 2 .13:  Failure Detect ion Time  
2.5.1.2  Effect on network Applications  
 
After analyzing failure detection time the effect of proposed scheme on 
network applications is studied. The application selected for testing is 
FTP. First end-to-end delay of FTP is analyzed without introducing L2 
frames and then with introducing  L2 frames.  
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Figure 2 .14:  Effect  of  L2 Frames  
In this plot x-axis represents time in seconds and y -axis represents end-to-
end delay for FTP application. In the plot blue line represents end -to-end 
delay without introducing L2 frames and red line represents end -to-end 
delay with introducing L2 frames. Before introducing L2 frames the delay  
ranges between  8ms and 10ms and after introducing L2 frames it  ranges 
between  10ms and 14ms.  End-to-end delay increases but the increase is 
not very significant.  
2.5.1.3  Bandwidth Utilization  
 
After calculating failure detection time and effect on end-to-end delay we  
analyze bandwidth consumption. First theoretical bandwidth requirement 
is calculated.  
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Calculations based on 802.3 MAC 
   
MAC Preamble & SD  8 Bytes 
MAC Source Address  6 Bytes 
MAC Dest.  Address  6 Bytes 
Length  2 Bytes 
Payload  48 Bytes 
CRC  4 Bytes 
FRAME Size          74 Bytes 
Inter Frame Gap  12 Bytes 
    
Total Frame Size  
86 Byes or 688 
bits 
Table 2.1:  Mathematical Calculat ions  
 
If this frame is sent every 10ms it  would be 688x100= 68.8 k bits per 
second and on 100Mbit/sec it  is sti ll  less than 1% utilization and in case 
of Giga bit  Ethernet, it  would be less than 0.1 percent.  
Next the bandwidth consumption is tested in NS2 simulation. The res ult  of 
this simulation in presented in Figure 2.15.  
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Figure 2 .15:  Bandwidth Consumption of  L2 Frame  
If these results are compared with the theoretical results,  they are not very 
far from each other. The bandwidth consumption varies from 70kbit/sec to 
80kbit/sec which is less than 1% of total available bandwidth.  
2.5.2  Loadsharing scheme  
 
As discussed earlier,  three possible methods for HA load sharing are 
proposed. These three different approaches were simulated in MATLAB. 
2.5.2.1  Load Sharing based on Number of Registrations  
In this method it  was same number of binding were kept on each HA 
without exceeding the maximum limits of both bandwidth and registered 
binding on all  HAs. This was simulated in MATLAB. User‟s traffi c was 
normally distributed from 0.1Mb/s to 1Mb/s with an average of around 
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0.5Mbits/sec. Simulation was run for 50 minutes. Average users 
registration rate was 2.5 registrations/min. Figure 2.16 shows that all  HA 
have almost equal number of registrations. Figure 2.17 shows HA 
throughput vs. time. In this graph, there is a variation in throughput. The 
load sharing method based on the number of registration  is very useful 
with the assumption that “standard deviations of user‟s traffic is small” 
remains valid.                          .                                     
 
Figure 2 .16:  Number of  users  vs.  t ime  
 
The first  approach was to equalize the number of MN registration on all  
HAs. For test case three HAs are considered. From this graphs in  Figure 
2.15 it  is clear that there is no significant variation in number of MN 
registrations on each HA. This graph rep resents one side aspect.  Now next 
graphs load/traffic through each HA is considered.  
Chapter 3         HA Management  
_____________________________________________________________  
51 
 
 
 
Figure 2 .17:  Bandwidth vs .  Time  
The plot of Figure 2.17 represents the variation in network traffic that is 
passing through each HA. As the number of registrations is equalized 
there is variation in network traffic. For simulation, load was normally 
distributed. In theory, if traffic generated by each HA has a normal 
distribution and if number of registrations are equalized , there should be 
no significant variation in the throughput of each HA. From the plot,  this 
theory is validated.  
Overall  this approach should be very useful for load sharing if traffic 
generated by each MN is normally distributed but this assumption may not 
be always valid.  
Chapter 3         HA Management  
_____________________________________________________________  
52 
 
2.5.2.2  Load Sharing based on Bandwidth Consumption  
In this method traffic generated on HAs is equalized. For simulation, MN 
traffic is normally distributed from 0.1Mbits/s to 1Mbits/s with an average 
of 0.5Mbits/sec. Simulation time is 50 minutes. On average, user 
registration rate is 2.5 registrations/min.  
In this approach, emphasis was on overall  traffic through each HA.   
 
 
 
Figure 2 .18:  Number of  Users vs.  Time  
 
The result of simulation is presented in Figure 2.18. In the Figure, there is 
significant variation in the number of registrations on each HA but with 
time, as the number of registrations increases, this difference is reduced.  
This is because the simulated traffic is normally distri buted, and as the 
Chapter 3         HA Management  
_____________________________________________________________  
53 
 
number of registrations is increased, the average traffic generated by all 
MNs on different HAs is almost the same. Since load through HAs is 
equalized, numbers of registrations on each HA are automatically 
equalized.  
 
Figure 2 .19:  Bandwidth vs .  Time  
In this plot of Figure 2.19, there is very little variation between the 
traffic through each HA. This validates that proposed scheme can 
distribute network traffic equally across the deployed H As. One drawback 
of this scheme is that it  is based on assumption that variation in MN 
generated traffic is very little.  But this assumption is not very realistic. In 
real life environment, some MNs may be  just browsing the web and others 
may be streaming videos. In such situation this approach will  not be very 
useful.  
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2.5.2.3  Load sharing based on both number of registration and 
bandwidth consumption   
In this scheme, HA assignment is based on available load handling 
capacity. For simulation purpose, MN traffic is normally distributed from 
0.1Mbits/s to 1Mbits/s with average of 0.5Mbits/sec. All HAs were 
considered to have same maximum throughput and max imum user handling 
capabilities.  
 
 
Figure 2 .20:  Number of  Users vs.  Time  
 
In this approach load was distributed in accordance with the cost 
function developed earlier where load is distributed based on avai lable 
load-handling capacity. For test case, three HAs were considered all 
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having equal load sharing capabilities.  In plot of Figure 2.20, there is a 
variation in the number of registrations on different HAs.  
 
 
 
Figure 2 .21:  Bandwidth vs .  Time  
 
The graph of Figure 2.21 presents the variation in network traffic passing 
through each HA. Load handling capacity was equalized and as a result 
there is a variation in network traffic. For simulation purpose, load w as 
normally distributed. Overall,  this approach should be very useful for load 
sharing as it  is independent of traffic variation between MN.  
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2.5.3  Comparison of the Loadsharing Schemes  
In this section a comparison of three possible HA load sharing schemes is 
presented. The first  scheme is based on equalizing total number of 
registrations. This scheme is suitable where all  HAs have an equal load -
handling capacity. This approach is more realistic because the HA will 
have to maintain IPsec tunnel with each MN and t his IPsec tunnel creation 
requires high speed memory (normally the RAM) which has a limited 
availability on HAs.   
Next scheme is based on equalizing the traffic throughput across different 
HAs. During simulation it  is observed that this scheme has fairly 
distributed HAs network traffic but the downside is that it  is based on 
assumption that variation in traffic generated by different MNs is not very 
significant. This assumption is not valid because in real life it  is easily 
possible that a mobile user will  use his mobile device just to check emails 
while another will be using his device for video conferencing.  
The last scheme is based on equalizing the available load -handling 
capacity. This scheme is very useful in situations where different HAs 
have different load-handling capabilities but the complex nature of the 
scheme makes it  difficult  to implement. This scheme and the scheme based 
on equalizing number of registration have almost similar results.  
Because of simple implementation and the effectiveness, the first 
approach is preferred over others.  
 
2.5.4  Comparison with existing load sharing Schemes  
In this subsection, the proposed HA load sharing schemes are compared 
with Deng‟s [22] and anycast load sharing of MIPv6. The technical report 
associated with refe rence 12 presents a simulation of Deng‟s load sharing 
scheme. In that OPNET simulation, 100 MN are considered. The 
simulation duration is 3000 seconds. MN registrations are simulated 
between 100s and 200s. Figure 2.22 presents the simulation results.  
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Figure 2 .22:  Deng Loadsharing for HA 
In this plot it  is obvious that Deng load sharing scheme fails to distribute 
load fairly among the HAs. After completion of simulation, HA1 
registered 86 MNs, HA2 registered 10 MNs and HA3 registered 5 MNs 
while HA4, HA5 and HA6 did not register any MNs. The main reason for 
this poor distribution of load is that all MNs used DHAAD to explore HAs 
on home network. Once all  HAs were explored, the most preferred HAs 
were selected by MN. If these results are compared with any of the three 
proposed schemes, it  is obvious that the load sharing capabilities of the 
proposed schemes are far superior to that of Deng‟s load sharing scheme.  
Next, the proposed load sharing schemes are co mpared with MIPv6 
standard‟s load sharing. In MIPv6, load sharing is based on anycast 
addressing where MNs registration requests are distributed in round robin 
fashion. This process is simulated in NS2 with simulation time of 25 
minutes. The registration rate is 15 users per minute. The plot in Figure 
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2.23 shows that this scheme is capable of sharing load equally among 
three HAs. If this scheme is compared with any of the proposed load 
sharing schemes then in term of results there is no significant differen ce.    
 
Figure 2 .23:  Anycast  HA loadsharing  
Now consider a scenario where load sharing is based on anycast 
addressing and there is failure of an HA. In such a situation, anycast 
addressing will  continue to distribute HA registrations between all  HAs. 
Any MN, whose registration request is forwarded t o the failed HA, will  
not get registered and the MN will  have to re -send the registration 
request.  Now if the failed HA recovers, it  will  start processing the 
registration requests but initially it  will  have zero registrations. So at this 
point there will  be a significant difference in the number of registrations 
on each HA. This scenario is simulated in NS2 where simulation time was 
25 minutes with average registration rate of 15 users per minute. One of 
the HA was failed after 12 minutes into the simulati on. The resulting 
distribution of MN registrations on different HAs is il lustrated in Figure 
2.24.  
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Figure 2 .24:  Anycast  loadsharing with Single HA Failure  
This plot shows the shortcomings of the load shari ng scheme based on 
anycast addressing. After 25 minutes of simulation, there is a significant 
difference between the number of registrations among HA2 and HA3 and 
HA1. The reason for this difference in number of registrations is that in 
anycast load sharing there is no feedback mechanism to check the actual 
load status. In proposed schemes there is a feedback mechanism which 
checks the number of registrations and traffic throughput on each HA 
before assigning HA to any MN. If a similar scenario had occurred  in any 
of the proposed schemes, the load sharing scheme would have started 
assigning the failed HA to all  new registering MNs. Along with this,  it  
could have forced some MNs from the non -failed HA to register with this 
recovered HA.  
From the discussion i t  can be concluded that the proposed schemes 
provide superior HA load sharing as compared to either Deng load sharing 
or anycast load sharing of MIPv6 RFC.  
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2.6 Chapter Summary 
Aim of this thesis is to make seamless mobility in IP based heterogeneous 
network more reliable. MIPv6 is considered the standard for mobility in IP 
networks. This mobility protocol has one weak point and that is its 
dependency on HA. Architecture of MIPv6 makes HA as single point of 
failure. This chapter presents an architecture that wi ll  make HA more 
reliable and thus will increase reliability of overall  mobility protocol. 
Along with reliability the important issue of load sharing in case of 
multiple HA deployment is also addressed. Reliability is treated in terms 
of Mobility service availability. This “availability” can be increased by 
addressing two aspects, first to quickly detect an HA failure and second to 
quickly recover from HA failure. For the first part,  a cross layer approach 
is used by embedding higher layer information into L 2 frames. The reason 
for choosing L2 frames was to reduce the packet size which enables us to 
send it  more frequently without involving routers. For second part,  which 
is quick recovery, a scheme is devised in which there is a backup HA for 
every MN. In case where there is a failure of primary HA for a particular 
MN, its back-up HA will  send a message to MN to switch its primary HA. 
This will  reduce the overall  service unavailability for a certain MN.  This 
reliability approach will  not match the performanc e of a scheme where 
there is one-to-one redundancy for every HA but that was not the aim. The 
aim of this research is increase HA availability without introducing any 
redundancies in HA deployment which will  decrease overall  equipment 
cost and will be a li ttle greener on energy consumption.  
The work presented in this chapter was considered as one of the early 
stage solution for IST project ENABLE but later on IETF approach [14] 
was modified to meet the special needs of ENABLE project.  
In IETF working group Mobility EXTensions for IPv6 (MEXT), there are 
discussions going on about HA reliability. First  draft  for standardization 
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was supposed to be submitted in December 2008 but til l  date it  has not 
been submitted.  In the discussions two possible approaches fo r HA 
reliability based on the HA switching mechanism are considered.  One 
type of HA switching is called “Soft Switch” where HA failure recovery is 
completely transparent to MN and the other type is called Hard Switch 
where the HA failure is not transparen t to MN. In term of IEFT 
discussions, the solution presented here supports hard switch where MN is 
aware of HA failure on home link.  
In ENABLE project,  we have developed a solution based on “Soft  
Switch”. Details of that solution can be found is Deliverab le three (D3 in 
[3]) of the project. The biggest problem to support soft switch is the 
requirement of synchronizing SAs between MN and HA across both Active 
and standby HA. The SAs are both time and IP dependent. Synchronizing 
them requires huge amount of data exchange. This very requirement makes 
it  highly un-likely that it  would ever be deployed in industry.  
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Chapter 3 
 
 
 
3  HA Management 
Previous chapter presents a model based approach for increasing HA 
Reliability by quickly detecting HA failure and by introducing quick 
recovery scheme. That scheme should work fine in a medium sized 
deployment of MIPv6, but for large scale deployment there is a need for a 
new framework for HA Management.  
This chapter presents a state of the art  framework for HA Managemen t 
based on autonomic computing concept which introduces self -healing and 
self-optimization in an HA deployment. This self -healing and self-
optimization aspect of the proposed scheme will  increase the reliability of 
mobility Protocol which in turn will  incr ease the overall  reliability of the 
seamless mobility of MN in IP based seamless mobility.  
At the end of this chapter this proposal is extended to support different 
network services like web services which means that this scheme can be 
generalized for any network service.  
3.1 Introduction  
In Next generation networks it  is anticipated that everything would be 
IP based including telecom networks.  For Mobility in IP based networks, 
MIPv6 is accepted as standard. It  is expect that there would be a large 
scale deployment of MIPv6 and for this large scale deployment there is a 
need for a whole framework for HA management.  
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In the previous chapter a solution for HA reliability was presented 
along with a review of existing solutions but these solutions may not be 
suitable for large scale deployment.  This chapter presents a framework 
for HA Management based on the concepts of Autonomic Computing. By 
introducing these concepts, HA system would be able to monitor itself and 
perform self-healing and self-optimization.  
In remaining part of this chapter a review of existing management 
schemes used in industry for monitoring and detecting failure of a 
node/server is presented which is followed by the proposed framework. In 
the subsequent sections simulation results are prese nted and later on 
before conclusion an extension of this framework is presented which 
supports other services like web or SIP etc.  
 
3.2 Related Work  
A typical Sever management scheme includes three distinct functions. 
First  is to get specific information from  a server, second to detect any 
failures and third to report anomalies to the Management Interface. To 
explain existing mechanism a generic network scenario of Figure 3.1 is 
drawn.  
Consider a typical network scenario of Figure 3.1 .  In this scenario there 
are three servers responsible for providing different services like 
Authentication, Email,  SIP and Mobility services. There is a monitoring 
Node, responsible for monitoring the health of different servers. This 
figure would be used for introducing different schemes used in industry 
for server management.  To authors‟ knowledge, there is no existing 
scheme for HA management. There are some solutions which address HA 
reliability which have been discussed in previous chapter. So the existing 
management schemes for difference servers/services, which are used in 
industry, are reviewed.  
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Figure 3 .1:  Typical Servers Deployment 
 
There are three popular schemes used in industry for management of 
different services.  
 
3.2.1  SNMP based monitoring 
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) [23] is a component of 
Internet Protocol suite as defined by IETF. SNMP is used in network 
management systems to monitor network-attached devices including 
routers, switches, firewalls and servers.  It  consists of set of standards for 
network management, including an application layer protocol, a database 
schema and a set of data objects.  Using  its standard procedures, it  can 
deliver a very diverse set of information but this diversity is the very 
problem which makes it  really slow. It  is good for monitoring node‟s CPU 
utilization, memory and network traffic etc parameters but slow nature of 
this protocol makes it  un-useable for monitoring networks attached 
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devices used in real time data. In this case, for a high availability of HA, 
there is a need to reduce the failure detection time. This reduction of 
failure detection time can be achieved by i ntroducing a faster monitoring 
scheme.  If SNMP is selected for HA monitoring, this will  delay the 
overall  monitoring process and hence affect the availability.  
 
SNMP introduction:  
In typical SNMP [23] based monitoring system there are a number of 
systems which are managed by one or more systems.  A component of 
SNMP called agent runs on each managed system which reports 
information via SNMP to the managing system. SNMP agents expose 
management data to the managing systems as variables, such as CPU load, 
free memory, free diskspace etc. This protocol also allows active 
management tasks, such as modifying and applying a new configuration. 
The managing system can retrieve the information through the GET ,  
GETNEXT  and GETBULK  protocol operations or the agent will send 
data without being asked using TRAP  or INFORM  protocol operations. 
Management systems can also send configuration updates or controlling 
requests through the SET  protocol operation to actively manage a system. 
Configuration and control operations are used only when changes are 
needed to the network infrastructure. The monitoring operations are 
usually performed on a regular basis.  The variables accessible via SNMP 
are organized in hierarchies. These hierarchies ar e described by 
Management Information Bases ( MIBs).  
 
SNMP procedures for simple network:  
Here SNMP procedures are explained with reference to Figure 3.1. In this 
figure, there are three servers (Server A, Server B and Server C) which are 
the managed elements and a Monitoring Node is managing them. SNMP 
agent is running on Server A, Server B and Server C. Managing node, 
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which in this case is monitoring node can use GET ,  GETNEXT ,  and 
GETBULK, TRAP  or INFORM primitives to collect the data from the 
servers. In case if GET  primitive is used, when it  is received by any of 
the managed element, the managed element will  reply with required 
information. This information is organized in hierarchies called MIBs. 
Using these MIBs, the data is translated to Human readable form. Using 
this data, further control decision can be made by either network 
administrator or some automated script.  
After explaining SNMP procedure, it  is clear that this process is very slow 
for monitoring network attached elements. For today‟s real time data like 
videoconference or VoIP application, SNMP would be struggling to 
provide the monitoring data in -time. 
 
3.2.2  WSDM-based Content Service Status  Monitoring Scheme 
This is web based node monitoring scheme developed in Fudan University, 
Shanghai [24]. Down side of this scheme is that it  requires a whole new 
platform to work. So its implementation is not very easy. It  was design to 
monitor health of any “Service Access Point”. Data collection scheme is 
based on web queries and to support web queries monitored node should 
have a web server running on it .  
Basic idea of web base monitoring is very simple. There are two nodes 
involved, one being the monitored node and other which is monitoring 
node. The monitored node hosts its data on its own web server. Each 
parameter available for web based monitoring has a specific URL. The 
monitoring node just sends a web query on specific URL to get the value 
of specific parameter.  
This approach is very simple and fast but like SNMP based monitoring, it  
involves a send request and a reply request. Unlike SNMP, which can use 
both TCP and UDP, this web based monitoring can only use TCP. A TCP 
connection establishment requires three way handshakes, which make the 
overall  process slow for frequent monitoring.  
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Web Based Monitoring procedures for simple network:  
Here Web Based Monitoring procedures are explained in reference to 
Figure 3.1. There are three servers (Server  A, Server B and Server C), 
which are being monitored by Monitoring Node. Web Service is running 
on Server A, Server B and Server C. Monitoring Node, can using simple 
web client  to read the desired data from the servers. Since this scheme 
uses TCP for transport,  a three-way handshake must be preformed to 
establish this required TCP connection. Once data is being read,  further 
control decision can be made by either network administrator or some 
automated script.  
In reference to Figure 3.1.,  Server A, Server B and Server C are 
responsible to keep the data up to date on their unique URLs. Again, how 
frequently this data is updated is yet another problem. In some networks 
transparent web cache is deployed which creates problem for this 
approach, as the data may be stored in these caches. There is a possibility 
that the monitoring node will  read old data from cache. Normally 
administrators use this web based monitoring for one time readout.  
3.2.3  Microsoft SMF 
The Service Monitoring and Control [25] (SMC), a service management 
function (SMF) is responsible for the real -time observation and alerting of 
health (identifiable characteristics indicating success or failure) 
conditions in an IT computing environment. Down side is that i t  is not 
fast.  The failure detection part of the scheme is very slow. Data collection 
process for monitoring purpose is not disclosed.  
 
3.3 State of the Art: Autonomic Approach 
IBM as a part of Autonomic Computing introduced the concept of self -
healing back in 2003 [26]. Aim of introducing this concept was to reduce 
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computing systems administration cost and administration complexity. The 
vision of IBM was a computing system that can manage them in 
accordance with higher level of administration objective. Based on 
functions/requirements, Autonomic computing was further split  into 
different domains including self -configuration, self-optimization, self-
healing and self-protection.  
3.3.1  Self-Configuration  
This domain covers the configuration and integration related problems of 
computing system.  
3.3.2  Self-Optimization  
This domain covers the Operations and Maintenance aspect of computing 
system. An autonomic system should have the ability of running itself in 
peak performance all the time.  
3.3.3  Self-Healing  
These domains address the issue of failures in comp uting systems. 
Normally it  can take up to weeks to identify the problem in a large 
computing system. An autonomic system should be able to identify the 
problem and try to isolate it .   
3.3.4  Self-Protection  
Autonomic system should self -protect in two senses. They should defend 
the system as whole against large -scale, correlated problem arising from 
malicious attacks or cascading problems that are not covered by self -
healing function. They should also anticipate problems and take steps to 
avoid or mitigate them.  
 
3.4 Architecture of Autonomic system  
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As mentioned in [26], an autonomic system consists of autonomic 
elements that are individual systems which provide services to humans. 
The behaviour of these autonomic elements is controlled by goals or 
objectives set by humans. These autonomic elements also interact with the  
environment.  
The basic functional structure of one such autonomic element is shown in 
Figure 3.2.  Here in this figure there is an autonomic manager and a 
managed element. This autonomic manager is responsible to controlling 
the managed element is accordance with higher level of objectives or 
goals.  
 
 
Figure 3 .2:  Autonomic Computing Basics  
 
The managed element could be a utility or an application. The autonomic 
manager is responsible for collecting different information from sensors in 
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managed element. This function is labelled as Mon itor in the figure. Once 
the data is collected it  is analyzed by the Analyzer. Knowledge represents 
AI module, which contains a databank and is able to suggest best course 
of action. Plan function represents higher level objects. The Execute 
function is responsible for executing the suggested course of action.  
An autonomic element is responsible for i ts own internal state, its 
behaviour and its interaction with environment. Its actions are governed 
by the goals or objective set by the administrator. There c ould be different 
levels of autonomic elements. At lower level it  could be either a single 
disk drive or single workstation. At higher level i t  could be either a 
cluster of systems or a whole enterprise.  
 
3.5 Analysis and Motivation  
This was the vision of what an autonomic computing would look like but 
as with many other suggested proposals, this is not production version of 
such system. There are many challenges to this proposal.  One such 
challenge is how these autonomic elements wil l  interact with each other. 
Another challenge is homogenous policy definition. Another is 
management of these autonomic elements. Another is designing. Another 
is monitoring, what to monitor and how to monitor it .  Another is 
installation and configuration of autonomic element and to make it aware 
of its environment. Another is resolving system wide issues ranging from 
hardware to software and translating them to unified language. Securing 
these elements is another outstanding issue. Last but not least, if a ll 
mentioned issues are resolve, the designing, testing and verification poses 
a challenge itself.    
Main idea of autonomic computing was that all  computing systems 
perform self-management and self-configuration but this idea remained 
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limited to a “Computing system”. Later on the concept of this autonomic 
computing was introduced to Networks.  
For HA management framework, the architecture is kept in line with IBM 
vision of Autonomic computing. The details are discussed in next section.  
 
3.6 Framework for HA Management 
To explain the framework, it  is essential to first  discuss its building 
blocks. 
 
 Event Monitoring 
 Serious Incident Detector  
 Reaction Module 
 
3.6.1  Module: Event Monitoring  
 As shown in Figure 3.3, this consists of two sub-functions. One is 
responsible for actual RAW data delivery to a target and other for 
receiving the data. First  module, which is responsible for sending data, 
can co-exist on server.  It would collect data from server and will  send it 
to the monitoring node. Second Module, which is responsible for receiving 
this data, resides in the Monitoring node.  
Chapter 3         HA Management  
_____________________________________________________________  
72 
 
 
Figure 3 .3:  Event Monitoring Module  
This monitoring data packet structure is very critical.  If the packet size is  
huge, i t  cannot be sent frequently. If it‟s small, i t  cannot carry enough 
information. To address this problem a radical approach is adopted based 
on cross-layer design.  By embedding application layer encoded 
information in payload of a L2 frame this problem can be resolved.  This 
unique method would resolve the dilemma by keeping the packet size 
small and still  carrying enough information.  
Here the actual packet structure is pre sented that would be used to send 
out the data. Please note that this frame structure is kept generic so it  can 
be used for any application.  
 
 
Figure 3 .4:  Monitoring Data Frames  
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This frame is engineered to have the capability of using IPv4 and IPv6 
transport mechanism if required. This frame can send eight different 
parameters related to HA. For evaluation of the scheme, only two 
parameters are considered. 16 bits are assigned for each parameter. In the 
parameters section of packet, first  16 bits represent active registrations 
and next 16 bit  represent the bandwidth consumption is kilobits.  Other 
possible parameters could be CPU utilization, RAM utilization, available 
disk space etc.  
From this packet structure it is very clear that detailed information is 
being sent by sensor in server, utilizing very small bandwidth. If fact it  
used about 74 bytes per frame. This frame designed supports up to eight 
different parameters in a single frame.  
Apart from sending critical information, the data is used for actual failure 
detection. In the simulation, failure detection time was less than 45ms 
while utilizing network capacity by only 0.01 percent. Details of testing 
are mentioned in result  section.  
3.6.2  Module: Serious Incident Detector  
This module will  receive the data from receiver/collector in monitoring 
node. This data is in RAW form and needs classification. Data is 
classified based on server status code and severity of error. Once errors 
are classified, all the  critical and fatal error on server would be forwarded 
to Reaction module.  
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Figure 3 .5:  Incident Detect ion Module  
Apart from classification of errors, this module is also responsible for 
generating reports for administrator.  
3.6.3  Reaction Module  
 Based on the data received from SID, it  will try to diagnose/locate 
the problem. Once exact problem is identified, it  would be forwarded to 
“Reaction Center”. This module will  first  try to identify solution in its 
database where per-defined actions are listed by network administrator. If 
no solution is found, it  will  consult the AI module. AI module would try 
to generate a solution. In our case, due to lack of expertise in AI field, it  
has been left  for future development .  
Once appropriate solution is found, it  would be forwarded to the 
“Translator” which is responsible for translation of solution to actual 
“command/instruction” for the server.  
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Figure 3 .6:  React ion Centre 
 
3.6.3.1  Problem/Fault Identification  
This sub-module is responsible for performing five functions.  
i . Locate Exact Server (its IP address or Host name)  
ii . Identify Application and load it  error table  
ii i . Look for error ID in its table  
iv. Identify Problem  
v. Forward this exac t  problem to “Reaction Center”  
3.6.3.2  Reaction Centre  
This sub-module is responsible for finding appropriate solution for 
any fault .  It  is a three-step process.  
i . First Identify Platform and Application, for example Linux 
and Apache 
ii . Look for possible reasons that can result in that error.  
ii i . Construct a solution, let  it  be called a  “Task”, for Executer 
and forward it  to Translator  
For third step, either a pre-defined solution table is needed or some 
sort of AI module is required that could deduct  conclusion.  
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3.6.3.3  AI module  
This module is responsible for taking intelligent decisions based on 
previous events and feed data. Due of lack of expertise this AI 
module is not developed and is left for future development.  
3.6.3.4  Translator  
Function of this sub-module is quite simple. It  would translate 
the designed task to actual command line code that can run on 
the server. Once translation process is complete, the actual code 
would be forwarded to executor.  
3.6.3.5  Executor  
This sub-module will  receive the code from translator and execute i t  
on actual server. It  can used standard protocols line telnet or ssh for 
this task. 
 
 
 
3.7 The Framework  
This framework is based on the original concept of autonomic computing. 
In original concept, autonomic element ( Figure 3.2) is the building block 
of an autonomic system.  Autonomic element continuously monitors 
system behavior through “sensors” and make adjustments through 
“effectors”. By monitoring behavior through sensors, analyzing the data, 
then planning what action should be taken next and executing that action 
through effectors. This whole process makes a kind of “control loop” as 
mentioned in [27] Figure 3.7.  
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Figure 3 .7:  Autonomic Control Loop  
 
In this framework a similar control loop is implemented based on three 
base modules (Figure 3.7) which are Monitoring module, Incident 
Detector and Reaction Module.  
 
 
 
Figure 3 .8:  Proposed Architecture  
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The Monitoring module monitors the data and performs the function 
“Measure”. The Incident Detector and reaction module combined, perform 
the functions  “control”, “Decide” and “Resource”.  
Functionally and structure of all  these three modules  has been explained 
in the basic building blocks. The whole framework is explained with help 
of a test case in next section.  
 
3.8 Test Case  
This section presents a typical scenario for deployment of proposed HA 
Management. Consider a situation in which there  are three HA and one 
Monitoring node as show in Figure 3.9.  
 
 
 
Figure 3 .9:  Typical HA deployment  
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In terms of Autonomic Computing, HA1, HA2 and HA3 are the managed 
elements and monitoring node is an autonomic manager as show in Figure 
3.10. 
 
 
Figure 3 .10:  Typical  HA deployment and Autonomic System  
 
First  module in our proposed scheme is Monitoring node. In this scenario, 
data sending part is located on each managed element that is HA1, HA2 
and HA3. Data Receiver part is located in Autonomic Manager which in 
this case is HA Manager.  
The Data sender part is sending data frames to autonomic manager in 
accordance with Figure 3.4. These frames are sent every 10ms containing 
parameters like number of registration, bandwidth consumption, CPU 
load, remaining RAM and disk space.  
Consider a case where this framework is deployed in production 
environment where  there are thousands of users registered for mobility 
Chapter 3         HA Management  
_____________________________________________________________  
80 
 
service. If HA allocation is random then after sometime, there would be 
un-equal number of registrations on different HAs.  Let‟s assume that 
HA1 reported a high CPU load and high HA registration than i ts threshold.  
As humans, we can predict that because of this high CPU load and number 
of registrations, the user experience would not very good for the mobility 
service. Aim of developing this Autonomic Scheme was to enable this 
system to detect this problem and rectify this problem without allowing it  
to develop into some serious problems like HA failures or service outage.  
Consider that frame as shown in Figure 3.11, is received by data receiver 
of monitoring module. Once the “data receiver” receives this frame, it  is 
forwarded to the Incident Detector, which is the second module of this 
autonomic management. Incident Detector will  read different parameter 
and if there is something alarming, it  would forward packet to the 
Reaction Module and at the same time it  would generate a report for 
administrator. In Incident Detector, Normal range for registered MN  for 
this server is define as less than 2000 and CPU utilization is define as less 
than 90 percent. In case of this frame, there are two parameters shooting 
off the limits.  One is CPU load and the other is number of registrations. 
So the Incident Detector will  forward this to Reaction module.  
 
Figure 3 .11:  Embedded upper Layer Data  
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Once the packet is received by Reaction module, it  will identify the exact 
server based on either MAC address in frame or IP addr ess. Based on 
frame data, it  will  identify the service running on the server.  Next step is 
to identify the problem.  
In case of the frame mentioned in Figure 3.11, there are two problems that 
would be forwarded to the reaction center.  
Reaction center would first  identify the platform, which can be done in 
different ways. One simple approach would be to pre -configure the 
reaction center with the platforms. It is assumed to be detected as Linux. 
Next the Reaction center would try to rectify this problem with help of 
either pre-written routines or by consulting the AI module. As mentioned 
before, the AI module is not developed due to lack of expertise in th e 
field. Consulting a pre-written routine, reaction center establish a solution 
that is to re-distribute some load (which in our case is mobile nodes) to 
other servers.  This solution would be forwarded to the translator which 
would translate this solution  to a platform dependent code which will  be 
executed the by executers.  For example code generated for a Linux based 
platform would be different from that of a Solaris based platform.  
Once the executor has executed the code, it  would instruct HA1, to re -
distribute some of its load among neighboring HAs, which are HA2 and 
HA3. HA1 could use different methods like “HA switch” message as 
discussed in previous chapter to re -distribute the load.  
3.9 Simulation Results  
For simulation, the Event Monitoring module was  tested in NS2. Other 
modules are software implementation and for the time being are left for 
future development. In NS2 simulation, the actual L2 frames with fixed 
length of 74 bytes were created. These frames represent the actual data 
frames that would be used for sending information from Data Sender to 
Data Receiver.  
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Figure 3 .12:  Test  Scenario  
 
A typical topology of Figure 3.12 is implemented in the simulation. HA1 
was sending L2 frames to HA manager.   
Following aspects were analyzed through NS2 simulation  
 Bandwidth consumption of L2 frames  
 Effect of these frames on application in terms of end to end delay  
 
3.9.1  Bandwidth Utilization  
First,  the bandwidth consumption is analyzed.  Here is the mathematical  
computation for theoretical calculations.  
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Calculations based on 802.3 MAC 
 
MAC Preamble & 
SD: 8 Bytes 
MAC Source 
Address 6 Bytes 
MAC Dest.  Address  6 Bytes 
Length 2 Bytes 
Payload 48 Bytes 
CRC 4 Bytes 
FRAME Size 74 Bytes 
Inter Frame Gap 12 Bytes 
  
Total Frame Size 
86 Byes or 688 
bits 
Table 3.1:  Frame Calculat ions  
If this frame is sent every 10ms, then in one second there would be 
688x100= 68.8 k bits per second and on 100Mbit/sec which is still  less 
than ONE PERCENT Utilization and in case of Giga bit  Ethernet,  it  would 
be less than 0.1 percent.  
If these results are compared with the simulation results,  they are not ever 
far from each other. The bandwidth consumption varies from 67kbit/sec to 
77kbit/sec which is less than 1% of total available bandwidth.  
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Figure 3 .13:  Bandwidth Uti l izat ion  
 
3.9.2  Effect on network Applications  
After analyzing the bandwidth consumption, effect on latency is analyzed. 
For this first  calculated the end to end delay of the network without 
introducing L2 frames and then with L2 frames.  
In the plot (Figure 3.14) black colored lines represent end to end delay 
without introducing L2 frames and red lines represent end to end delay 
after introducing L2 frames. Initially it  was between 4ms - 7ms and after 
introducing L2 frames it  was between 5.5ms - 9ms.  Network latency has 
increased but this increase in not very significant.  
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Figure 3 .14:  Effect  on Network Applicat ions  
3.10 Extension of the framework to support generic 
service point   
The proposed scheme can be adopted to support different type of 
applications.  For this,  modification of data which is sent to Monitoring 
node is required.  Along with this modification Incident detector and the 
reaction module also requires modification.  This can be achieved by 
adopting modular approach. In the Figure 3.15 the actual packet structures 
that can the used for other applications is presented.  
This frame is engineered to have to capability of using IPv4 and IPv6 
transport mechanism if required. In this frame, information regarding two 
services/applications  running on a single machine can be sent.  16 bits are 
assigned for application identification. Standard port numbers are used for 
application identification. For example if service that is being monitored 
is a web server; 80 should be used as application I D. 8 bits are allocated 
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for application status, 5 of which are reserved. In fact only 3 bit  status 
code is used for a server. which gives us a range of 0 -7 in numerical. If 
status is 7 it  means that the service is healthy and if i t  is Zero, it  means 
that service is not running. 8 bits are reserved for error identification. For 
each application a lookup table containing up to 2^8 entries should exist 
in reaction center.  If error number 99 is being sent but senor in server, it  
would be interpreted as 99th ent ity in lookup table for that application.  
 
Figure 3 .15:  Generic Services Support  
This explains the whole format. Consider an example where L2 frame 
carries application ID 80, status code of 4 and error ID of  99. When this 
frame is received by the monitoring node, it  would interpret this as error 
number 99, which is disk space full ,  has occurred on web server is it  is 
currently running with health index of 4.  
From this example it  is very clear that detailed in formation is being sent 
by sensor in server util izing very small bandwidth.  
If any monitored node doesn‟t send data for three consecutive times, it  
would be declared as failed.  
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3.11 Chapter Summary 
With this architecture, self -monitoring, self-healing and self-management 
is introduced to a typical HA deployment. This self -management of HA 
system will  increase the overall  reliability and will  try to maintain an HA 
deployment in optimal state. These features help in increasing the overall 
reliability of Mobil ity Protocol which is vital for seamless mobility of 
Heterogeneous Networks.  
This chapter presents a novel approach of HA management based on 
autonomic computing. By adopting autonomic approach, a Home Agent 
system can be efficiently managed. This approach is more robust and can 
be extended to other application as described in the last section.  
In this proposal there are three modules which are responsible for HA 
management. Out of three modules, one module used in this proposed 
architecture is simulated in NS2. Other two modules require software 
implementations and their “run time” depends on the server processing 
power and the software architecture of these modules. The critical entity 
for this scheme is the actual data delivery and monitoring. As mentioned 
before it  was simulated in NS2 and the results are presented in the result s 
section of this chapter. The results were similar to what was expected, 
especially the effect on latency.  
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Chapter 4 
 
 
 
4  Fast and Secure Handover in FMIPv6 
 
In next generation all -IP based networks, a large number of mobile nodes 
are expected to use MIPv6 protocol for mobility. In mobile environment 
one frequent cause of service disruption is handovers. When MN moves, at 
some point MN will  reach the physical border of its current wireless 
network and will  enter an area covered by another wireless network. In 
such a situation, MN must switch to the new wireless network. This 
switching is called handover. This handover process is very slow. Fast 
handover for MIPv6 (FMIPv6) [42] has been developed as an extension 
protocol to reduce the handover latency and packet loss inherent with 
MIPv6. The RFC [42] for FMIPv6 is categorized as “Experimental” by 
IETF because it  is not in compliance with MIPv6 standa rd. One major 
compliance issue is that MIPv6 standard requires that all the messages 
exchanged between MN and HA should be secured. In FMIPv6 this  is not 
guaranteed. In this chapter a modified FMIPv6 is presented which makes 
it  in-line with MIPv6 standard. The major problem with adding security to 
FMIPv6 is that if you add additional steps to FMIPv6 protocol, it  will  
become slow. But the main aim of designing FMIPv6 was to make the 
handover process fast.  Hence, the challenge is to add security without 
adding any significant delay to the overall  protocol performance. This 
challenge is recognised by IETF‟s “mishop” working group. The aim of 
this group is to work on designing “handover key” or HoKey. If FMIPv6 is 
combined with HoKey, the protocol will  become c ompatible with MIPv6 
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standards. With this combination, FMIPv6 is secured without any 
significant delay. Thus, by reducing overall service disruption time it  can 
be claimed that reliability of communication has increased which is in -
line with the aim of thi s thesis.  This work was part of FP6 project 
ENABLE, and the actual testbed was presented in projects final 
demonstration meeting at T.I. Labs in Turino.  
In addition to the security issue, FMIPv6 also suffers from the problem of  
failed-handovers. FMIPv6 is  based on anticipation of handovers which is 
not always accurate. Under certain test conditions, the success rate of 
correct anticipation ranges from 30 -35%. In this chapter a new AP 
selection scheme is present which can increase this success rate up to 
65%. 
4.1 Introduction   
In the vision of Next Generation Network, i t  has become mandatory for 
Mobile Node to constantly stay connected and seamlessly roam across 
different networks while enjoying the plethora of the 'all -IP' based 
services. A number of network layer mobility management solutions have 
been proposed. Amongst such candidate technologies, Mobile IPv6 has 
been widely accepted in the academics and industry. MIPv6 is 
standardized by the Internet Engineering Task Force as a viable option for 
delivering the required ubiquitous mobility services across an integrated 
heterogeneous network.  
As discussed in previous chapters, there are many issues that can interrupt 
Mobile IPv6 based communication. In this chapter, one of the most 
frequent causes of disruption  –  the handovers is introduced. To author‟s 
best knowledge, in IP based network there is no “Make before Break” 
style handover. One protocol, that comes close to making handovers 
seamless, is Fast Handover for Mobile IPv6 (FMIPv6).  
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In FMIPv6, static HA and HoA masks MN movements from CN. All 
packets sent to MN on it  HoA are received by HA, which are then 
forwarded to MN current location using its CoA. However, when MN 
reaches the physical border of i t  current AP and enters an area covered by 
another AP, the  MN must perform some standard procedure before 
regaining its connectivity. These procedures include scanning for suitable 
access point, switching access point, stateless address auto -configuration, 
Duplicate Address Detection (DAD), and finally updating b inding on 
Home Agent.  This sequence of procedures generally involves connection 
disruption and significant packet loss. FMIPv6 protocol is designed with 
the goal to reduce the handover latency and to assist  MN in selecting a 
suitable Access Point. This protocol allows an AR to offer services to an 
MN in order to anticipate the L3 handovers. This anticipation is based on 
L2 triggers. The procedures of FMIPv6 are explained with help of a 
signaling diagram below (Figure 4.1). 
FMIPv6 protocol enables an MN to request information on neighboring 
AP‟s and the subnets behind them. To do this,  MN sends a “Router 
Solicitation for Proxy Advertisement (RtSolPr) ” message. This solicitation 
may contain the ID of one or more APs, thus requesting subnet 
information corresponding to the AP. It  may also contain a wild card 
signifying a request for all  nearby ARs. In figure 4.1, when RtSolPr is 
received by old access router,  it  replies with Proxy Router Advertisement 
(PrRtAdv). When MN detects that a handover is required, it  sends a Fast 
Binding Update (FBU) to its current router (pAR). This message contains 
MNs‟ CoA in pAR network (pCoA) and the access router (nAR) tha t  MN 
is planning to switch to. At this point pAR sends a “Handover Initiate” 
(HI) containing link layer address of MN and pCoA. MN can optionally 
include nCoA. The nAR confirms the handover with a Handover 
Acknowledge (HAck) message that may provide furthe r nAR specific 
details.  Once the HAck is Received, pAR sends a Fast Binding 
Acknowledgement (FBAck) back to the MN, on pAR‟s link.  At this stage, 
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MN is ready to switch AP. After MN moves to nAR, it sends a Fast 
Neighbor Advertisement (FNA) message and completes handover 
signaling. This type of handover, characterized by the FBAck  received by 
the MN while it  is in  pARs networks, is called by the FMIPv6 a 
predictive handover.  FMIPv6 protocol also defines a reactive handover 
scenario which basically represents the case where  MN cannot predict a 
handover. In this case the FBU is sent from nAR‟s link after L2 handover 
is completed. It  is usually encapsulated in the FNA. The nAR then 
forwards the FBU message to pAR, which is followed by HA/HAck 
messages. In FP6 project ENABLE, FMIPV6 was selected as prime 
protocol for handovers.   
 
Figure 4 .1:  Standard FMIPv6 Signaling  
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A major problem in FMIPv6 is the un-secure design of the protocol. We, 
as partners, were assigned the task of securing FMIPv6. The details of 
which are discussed in Section 4.3 of this chapter. It  was  also a  
requirement to analyze if the added security will  induce any delays to 
FMIPv6 protocol. For this analysis,  a comparison with non -secure FMIPv6 
implementation is required for which a review of existing FMIPv6 
implementation is presented in next section.  
In addition to this un-secure nature, FMIPv6 also suffers from another 
problem which can result  in an increased number of total handovers and    
increased number of failed-handovers. In current FMIPv6 procedures, 
when MN detects a L2 trigger of “link going down”, i t  will go into active 
scanning mode. Once the scan is completed, it  will  select an AP with 
highest value of SNR. Tiebreaker for t his selection is the scan sequence. 
If two APs have same SNR, then the one that is scanned first will  be 
selected as next access point.  This selection of AP based on highest SNR 
is not an optimal solution.   
If MN does not select the optimal AP then there could be a considerable 
increase in total number of handovers during its mobility.  To explain this, 
consider the scenario of Figure 4.2.  In this Figure, there are four APs (A, 
B, C and D) and MN is moving from AP-A to AP-D as indicated by the 
doted arrow. Initially, MN is connected to AP-A. When MN moves toward 
AP-D, it  starts scanning after crossing the “link doing down range”.  After 
completion of scan, it  will  connect to AP -C because this AP will  have the 
highest value of SNR.  After some time when MN crosses the boundary of 
„link going down range‟ of AP -C it  will  again go in scanning mode and 
this time it  will  select AP-D as its the AP with highest SNR value. At 
close inspection of Figure 4.2, it  is observed that AP -A and AP-D have an 
overlapping transmission range and because of this overlap, there is no 
need for MN to perform a handover to AP -C. According to standard 
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FMIPv6 procedures, MN performs two handovers but in fact it  only 
requires one.   
A handover is classified as failed -handover when MN init iates handover 
with one AP and then moves to a coverage area of anther AP. In such 
situations, MN will  not be able to benefit  from FMIPv6, and its handover 
latency would be more than even the standard MIPv6 handovers. Through 
mathematical analysis later in  the chapter, it  has been proven that with 
non-optimal selection of AP, there is a considerable increase in 
probability of failed-handovers.  
 
Figure 4 .2:  MN movement and Network Coverage  
Consider a situation  where MN moves from AP-A to AP-D.  Assume that 
the trajectory that MN takes this time is through the centre of AP -A and 
AP-D. While following this trajectory, when MN enters the “overlap zone” 
and starts scanning, i t  will  detect that all  APs have the same  value of 
SNR. At this point MN will  select the AP which is scanned first.  Now if 
MN selects AP-C for handover and actually move to AP-D then the 
handover will  fail .   Whenever MN enters an overlapping zone which is 
cover by two or more APs there is probabi lity of failed-handover. Later in 
this chapter a novel scheme for an optimal selection of AP is proposed 
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which can reduce the overall  number of handovers and at the same time it 
can reduce the probability of failed -handovers.  
4.2 Literature Review 
In this sect ion some of the most recent and relevant work in the field of 
FMIPv6 deployment and implementation is discussed. In addition to this, 
some recent work related to optimal selection of AP during a handover is 
also presented.  
In reference [43], the author is the actual developer of FMIPv6 protocol 
for Linux platform. In this paper, the performance evaluation of FMIPv6 
over 802.11 WLAN is very comprehensive and detailed. For comparison of 
secure FMIPv6, this scheme was selected as benchmark. The developed 
testbed is almost the exact replica of what is suggested on fmipv6.org. 
Similar testbed was used by author for his paper. Author achieved a 
handover latency of 12.4ms with buffering and 42.7ms with buffering 
disabled on AR, in case of a predictive handover. In case of reactive 
handover, handover latency is about 2.45 seconds.  
In reference [44], a proprietary implementation is evaluated. 
Experimentation involves wired handovers with emulated delay of 40ms. 
This delay was configured for handover. These values were  chosen as they 
are closer to that of 3G systems. Similar to handover delays, link layer 
trigger are preconfigured which is again not a good approach. Triggers 
like link down were instant in a wired network but this is not the case for 
802.11 based networks. 
Another performance analysis of FMIPv6 is provided in reference [45]. 
Author‟s focus is on protocol overhead, wrong anticipation and buffer 
limitation on AR. They have shown that these vary largely depending on 
how close in terms of time the link layer trigger and actual link disruption 
is.  They computed an optimal separation between them. They also studied 
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overhead which depends on application used. If you send larger packets as 
in the case of VoIP or Video on demand, percentage overheads would be 
very low as compared to a simple web browsing data.  
The reference [46] also designs proprietary implementation of FMIPv6.  
Testbed was setup in back in 2001 when FMIPv6 RFC was not finalized, 
but this implementation has significant impact in IETF work. This 
experimental setup was a bit un-realistic and has been criticized in a 
number of papers. The procedures followed were also not appropriate. For 
example, L2 trigger were generated by command line so they were not 
actual triggers but just emulated signals. They  also neglected candidate 
AP discovery which has a huge impact on overall handover latency.  
All of the above implementations did not consider security issues of 
handover. Our goal was to make it  secure. The architecture of secure 
FMIPv6 is discussed in sec tion 4.3.  
In reference [67], a fast handover scheme based on FMIPv6 in a vehicular 
environment is presented. This scheme relies on IEEE 802.21 frame work 
for AP selection. Unlike FMIPv6, where MN goes into scanning mode 
after receiving L2 trigger, the proposed scheme suggests conta cting 
802.21 Information Server (IS) regarding neighboring AP. IS replies with 
a single and most optimal AP. This is a good approach but the problem is 
that 802.11 is sti ll  under development. There are many pending issues like 
how to populate Information Sever, where it  should be located, and how 
frequently the data on IS should be update. This means that unless 802.21 
is standardized, the proposed scheme cannot be implemented. Later in this 
chapter a novel scheme to assist MN in selecting optimal AP is pre sented.  
4.3 Architectural Overview of secure FMIPv6 
For security of FMIPv6 based handover, in IETF discussion it  was decided 
to secure the Fast Binding Update (FBU) message between AR and MN. 
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This is to protect against certain types of attacks.  In ENABLE pro ject this 
is exactly what was implemented. In the Figure below  logical components  
required for securing FMIPv6 are given.  
 
Figure 4 .3:  FMIPv6 Service Validat ion  
In Enable architecture, FMIPv6 is considered  as a premium service and is 
required to be authorized by either Mobility Service Provider (MSP) or 
Access Service Provider (ASP).  With reference to Figure 4.3, for service 
authorization, either SP or BCA-p interface is used. SP interface was 
considered out of scope of enable project as it  can be application specific.   
BCA-p interface was used for service authorization. It  was based on Client 
Certificate. MN presents a certificate issued by MSA/ASA. Once it  was 
authorized by MSA/ASA AAA server (called GSABA in ENABLE), MN 
was permitted to use FMIPv6 service.  
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After service authorization, Access Router/Access Points can authenticate 
MN based on Shared Keys.  
4.3.1  Component Description 
GSABA Server:   This is responsible to facilitate authorization and 
authentication. Its detailed structure can found in ENABLE Project 
deliverable ZZ. 
pAR and nAR :  These are service point entitles. In our case these are 
FMIPv6 enabled access routers.  
MN:  This is FMIPv6 enabled Mobile node.  
BCA:  It  is responsible for providing necessary bootstrapping information 
to the MN. For FMIPv6, this information would be the IP routable address 
of the pAR.  In our case it  was co -located with GSABA. 
The BAA asserts the authorization statements. Based on MN‟s profile 
which is available in the authorizing domain, such statements are 
generated by the BAA. The statements and parameters need to be 
conveyed to the MN. In addition the BAA needs to a uthenticate the MN.  
4.3.2  Interface Description 
The Bootstrapping Target Protocol (Tp-p):  This protocol is used between 
the BTs (i.e.  pAR and nAR) and the BCA in the GSABA Proxy/GSABA 
Server to exchange FMIPv6 service related information and to authorize  
BT to provide FMIPv6 service to the MN. This information could be 
encoded in Attribute Value Pair (AVPs)[] or in XML. For implementation 
AVPs were used.  
The Bootstrapping Protocol (BCA-p):  This protocol is used to convey 
bootstrapping information to MN and info rm the authorization decision 
taken by the BAA and BAA Proxy. The information could be encoded in 
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AVPs or in XML. Candidate transport protocols are EAP/PANA, DHCP, 
HTTP, and TLS. 
The Bootstrapping Agent protocol:  This is used between BAA Proxy and 
BAA to exchange information between BAA entities to enable them to 
make decisions and to deliver them to the BCA.  This information could 
be encoded in AVPs or in XML.  
The Service Related Protocol (SP):  This protocol runs between MN and 
BT (i.e. the pAR and nAR)..  
4.3.3  Message Flow 
In this section, detailed message flow of the overall  GSABA architecture 
with FMIPv6 is presented. The aim is to show how different entities 
interact to provide service bootstrapping. This message flow is divided 
into two parts. First part describes signaling involved during FMIPv6 
service initiation and the second part describes signaling involved during 
a handover.  
Assumptions made for this message flow are as follows:  
 Mobility service provider is capable of providing FMIPv6 server.  
 The GSABA Server is in the service authorizing domain and makes 
authorization decisions.  
 MN has already completed bootstrapping and has successfully 
connected to one of the Access Point.    
4.3.3.1  Messages Involved during FMIPv6 Service Authorization Phase  
This section presents the message flow details of the overall  GSABA 
architecture with FMIPv6 and aims to show how different entities interact 
to provide the service bootstrapping.  
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Figure 4 .4:  Mobil ity  Service Authorizat ion  
 
GSABA Address Discovery:  MN authenticates with Mobility Service 
Authorizer (i .e.  the home domain which authorizes network access) in 
order to get authorization for network access. (This is done completely 
independent of the FMIPv6 service bootstrapping). It  is assumed that the 
initial network access authentication uses EAP based authentication. At 
this stage MN knows GSABA server address.   
Key Generation:  During bootstrapping  a new key is generated by the MN 
and the AAA server called GSABA key that might be derived from EMSK 
generated after a successful EAP method authentication (some guidelines 
for further key derivation by using EMSK as a root key can b e found in 
[deliverable]).  This key is used for the protection of communication 
between MN and the GSABA AAA server (i .e.,  the BCA -p interface).  
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BCID Generation :  Additionally, a new identifier is generated by MN and  
GSABA AAA proxy with which the GSABA ke y (and therefore indirectly  
MN) is identified (called BCID for “Bootstrapping Client IDentifier”).  
 ABIREQ Message:  Services requests are done via the ABIREQ 
(Authorization and Bootstrapping Information REQuest) message. The 
minimum set of parameters included in the ABIREQ are the BCID, the 
identifier of the service that the MN wants to use (Service Request ID –  
SRID), and the corresponding identifier intended to be used on the SP 
interface (Service ID –  SID). The SRID could either be a service name 
alone or, additionally a bootstrapping target address if known by the MN.  
ABIRES Message:  Upon receiving the ABIREQ message, the GSABA 
Proxy sends an ABIRES message with the authorization decision and 
minimum information conveyed to the MN about the service poi nts (e.g. 
the IP address or FQDN of pAR). Additionally, the ABIRES can contain a 
key and an identifier (SID) to be used for accessing the service.  
HK Key Derivation:  With the information provided in the ABIRES,  
FMIPv6 service is bootstrapped as usual.  Fo r securing FMIPv6 signaling 
messages, a handover key (HK) is derived from the GSABA key shared by 
MN and GSABA proxy. Using the HOKEY [*] process, discussed in detail  
in the Next section.  
4.3.3.2  Message Involved during FMIPv6 Handover  
 In this section the actual  message flow for  FMIPv6 handover is 
described. The flow is presented in  Figure 4.5.  
Step 1: Detection of new AR: MN performs periodic wireless scan s. With 
the help of  L2 trigger, MN starts looking for a candidate access router.  
Step 2: RtSolPr: At this point MN sends a RtSolPr to pAR to resolve one 
or more Access Point Identifiers for subnet -specific information 
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Step 3: PrRtAdv: In reply to PrRtAdv,  pAR sends PrRtAdv message to 
MN. This message contains subnet -specific information.  
Step 4: nCoA Creation: From Subnet specific information about 
neighboring APs, MN creates nCoA.  
Step 5: HKReq: Using this nCoA MN generates HKReq Message. This 
message is  sent to nAR1. Aim of this message is to set up security 
association with candidate access router. In Enable project,  it  was decided 
that MN should establish Security Association with all  available candidate 
access router before the actual switch.  
Step 6:  nCoA Check: After HKreq is received by nAR1, it  should check if 
this newly created address (nCoA) can be used. If yes, then it  proceeds to 
next step.  
Step 7: SIReq: After having received HKReq and nCoA validation, it  
forwards this HKReq message to GSABA u sing SIReq message.  
Step 8-9: HK and SIRsp: GSABA checks the MAC contained in  HKReq 
from MN and if successful,  derives a new handover key for new candidate 
access router and returns SIRsp message including the result code and new 
handover key as well as AAA nonce. This SIRsp message is sent to nAR1.  
Step 10-12: HKRsp: Handover key is contained in SIRsp message. This 
key would be used to authenticate MN during a fast handover. Once this 
key is known, nAR sends the HKRes to MN.  
Step 13: Selection of nAR2: By now MN has established security 
association with all the candidate routers and is ready to switch to any of 
the available candidate access routers. Final selection of candidate Access 
router is based on L2 trigger.  
Step 15: HI Message:  This is a standar d FMIPv6 message, indicating that 
MN is about to initiate handover. This message is send to nAR by pAR.  
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Step 16: HAck message: If nAR is ready to accept connection from MN, it  
will acknowledge the HI message with HAck message.  
Step 14: FBU: Once the candidate access router is selected, MN sends 
FBU message to pAR. These messages are already secured by previous 
handover key (pHK) 
 
 
Figure 4 .5:Message f low for FMIPv6 service (predict ive mode)  
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Step 17: FBAck message: Once the pAR has received acknowledgment of 
HI message, it  sends FBAck to MN.  Again, this message is secured by 
pHK. 
Step 18: L2 Switch: At this stage, MN performs actual L2 switch by 
changing its active access point to nAR.  
Step 19: Once this step is complete, FNA message is sent to to nAR. This 
message is protected by handover key that was created in step 12.  
After this step, handover is complete.  
4.3.4  Securing FMIPv6 Signaling with HOKEY 
In HOKEY, handover master key (HMK) is pre -shared between MN and 
AAA and should not be used to protect any data. Handover key (HK) and 
handover integrity key (HIK) are derived from HMK. HK is used to secure 
the messages exchanged between MN and AR while HIK is used to secure 
the signaling between the MN and AAA.  
In GSABA, GSABA key is used as the HMK to derive the HK as well as 
the HIK. The HIK is used to protect the data between MN and GSABA 
proxy (i .e.  ABIRES/ABIREQ message) via the BCA -p interface and 
therefore is in fact the BCA Key. The HK can be derived by:  
HK = gprf+ (HMK, MN Nonce |  AAA Nonce |  MN ID |  AR ID |  “Handover 
Key”)  
Or, 
HK‟ = gprf+ (HMK, MN Nonce |  MN ID |  AR ID |  “Handover Key”)  
The gprf+ is used to derive the HK (where “|” indicates concatenation), 
which is an ASCII string with 12 -characters and no null termination. The 
MN nonce is generated by the MN and communicated to the AAA server in 
the HKReq message.  The AAA nonce is generated by AAA server and 
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sent to the MN in HKRsp message. The MN ID is the NAI of  MN and the 
AR ID is the IP address of  AR as seen by the MN.   
HK can be derived after MN attaches to an AR and HK can be generated 
during handover procedure. Thus, the probability for handover error 
induced by security mechanism will  be reduced as it  is possible for MN to 
leave its old link without FBU message.  
There are many advantages for setting up a SA between the MN and the 
AR before the actual fast handover process:  
 It  allows using the AAA infrastructure that is already in place to 
establish session keys for securing FMIPv6 signaling messag es. 
 The handover key derivation does not impact handoff latency.  
 The compromise of one AR or a particular handover key does not 
lead to the compromise of keys shared between the MN and any 
other AR. 
After service authorization, when the MN wants to set up SA with  AR, it 
sends a Handover Key request message (or HKREQ) to AR together with 
the GSABA Proxy‟s address (Step 5). The AR should send a SIREQ 
message to  GSABA Proxy specified by the GSABA Proxy‟s address (Step 
6). Upon receiving the SIREQ message fro m an AR, GSABA Proxy should 
check the user profile to confirm the authorization state and generate a 
new Handover key, and then return the handover key to the AR (Step 7). 
After AR receives MN‟s authorization state and handover key, it  may 
return a Handover Key Response message (or HKRES) to the MN (Step 8). 
The messages HKREQ and HKRES are specified in [HOKEY].  
While it  is attached to the pAR, the MN may detect a new AP ID. MN 
sends RtSolPr message to pAR to check whether the newly detected AP is 
attached to a new AR (Step 10). When pAR finds out it  is a new AR‟s AP, 
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pAR should return PrRtAdv message to the MN (Step 11). These two 
messages don‟t have to be secured.  
The MN sends FBU message to pAR when it  is willing to handover to nAR 
with FMIP service (Step 12). This message includes an authentication 
code (or MAC) generated using the previous handover key. The MAC may 
be transported re-using the Authentication Option specified in [RFC 4285] 
or defining a new FBU mobility header‟s mobility option. The MN ma y 
insert in the FBU the new HKREQ message to be delivered to the nAR for 
establishing the new handover key with it .  After successful 
authorization/validation, the pAR sends the Handover Initiate (HI) 
message to the nAR [RFC 4068] including the new HKREQ mo bility 
header addressed to nAR and the GSABA Proxy‟s address (Step 13). The 
nAR sends SIREQ to GSABA Proxy (Step 14), which requests the 
authorization state and the new handover key from GSABA Proxy. 
Subsequently, GSABA Proxy delivers the authorization sta tement and  
new handover key to nAR.  
The nAR returns HAck message to pAR with the HKRES mobility header 
for MN and the new CoA which will  be used by MN in the nAR domain. 
The tunnel between nAR and pAR for traffic forwarding is established 
(Step 16). The pAR sends FBAck message to MN and nAR. The FBAck 
message delivered to the MN has to include MAC and the new HKRES 
mobility header from nAR (Step 17). When MN attaches with the nAR,  
MN sends FNA message to nAR, which should be integrity secured by the 
new handover key established between MN and nAR.  
4.3.5  AAA Integration  
It  must be noted that almost all  telecommunication and Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs) make use of the Authentication, Authorization and 
Accounting Server (AAA server).  To support roaming betw een accesses 
domains, AAA broker services have been deployed to accomplish peering 
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of various providers. Such agreements symbolize business relations and 
have an impact on AAA message routing.  Due to this reason, our 
architecture leverages and integrates with the existing AAA infrastructure 
to reduce operational and deployment costs.   
The GSABA Proxy is in essence an AAA server which consists of the BCA 
and BAA Proxy co-located inside it .  The GSABA proxy will be located in 
the service providing domain (i .e.  the network that actually provides the 
service). The GSABA proxy acquires the authorization sta tements for the 
FMIPv6 service from the GSABA via BA-p interface using  AAA Proxy 
functionalities (which is same as any ordinary AAA server without any 
changes/modifications).  
The GSABA server  contains BAA component and is responsible for 
making the ultimate decision of authorizing the requested service (i .e. 
FMIPv6 in this case).  The GSABA service will  reside in the service 
authorizing domain (which is typically in the MN‟s home domain).  
ARs :( i .e.  The BT) as mentioned in previous section, AR which is t he 
pAR and nAR in our case provides the FMIPv6 to MN via the SP 
interface. In addition, BCA component is connected via TP -p to obtain 
configuration and authorization information of FMIPv6 related to a 
specific MN.    
 
4.4 Experimental Test-Bed Evaluation 
The testbed built  for secure FMIPv6 is shown in Figure 4.6. There are two 
access routers (AR), a mobile node (MN), a corresponding node (CN), 
Home Agent (HA) and Authentication and Authorization server.  
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Figure 4 .6:  FMIPv6 Testbed 
4.4.1  Detailed Description of Nodes  
AR:   ARs were based on highly optimized Linux based machines with 
Atheros chipset.  Latest Linux kernel 2.6.23 -rc3 available at that time was 
used. For Mobile IP, the recently  developed Universal Mobile IP  (UMIP) 
package was used. For routing, Quagga Routing Suite is used. The actual 
routing protocol used was RIPv3. Access routers were running the 
modified implementation of fmip-ar daemon developed by fmipv6.org. For 
route advertisement, Radvd was used.  
MN: MN was Linux based machine with Atheros chipset.  Again Linux 
kernel 2.6.23-rc3 was used. MN was also running UMIP and our modified 
implementation of fmip-mn daemon. 
Home Agent:   HA was Linux based machine with one Ethernet card. As 
with other nodes, kerne l version 2.6.23-rc3 was used with UMIP.  For 
route advertisement, Radvd was used. For routing, Quagga Routing Suite 
is used. The actual routing protocol used was RIPv3.  
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GSABA/Authentication Server:  Authentication /  Authorization server was 
again Linux machine. Softwares running on this machine were Apache 
(web server) with SSL support,  modified FreeRadius server and Quagga 
routing daemon.  
In Table 4.1 the exact specification of the each node used in testbed is 
given. 
Network 
Entity Hardware  OS 
WLAN 
card 
HA 
Intel Core 2 Duo 
desktop 
Linux kernel 
2.6.23-rc3  N/A 
pAR 
Sony VAIO 
Laptop 
Linux kernel 
2.6.23-rc3  
Atheros 
chipset 
nAR Siemens Laptop 
Linux kernel 
2.6.23-rc3  
Atheros 
chipset 
MN IBM T43p Laptop 
Linux kernel 
2.6.23-rc3  
Atheros 
chipset 
CN 
Intel Core 2 Duo 
desktop 
Linux kernel 
2.6.23-rc3  N/A 
GSABA 
Intel Core 2 Duo 
desktop 
Linux kernel 
2.6.23-rc3  N/A 
Table 4.1:  Testbed detai ls  
 
4.4.2  Test Description  
This section presents the objectives of all the tests  performed, their 
expected results,  and comparison of actual and expected results.  
The main objective of this testbed was to show that by adding security to 
FMIPv6, there would not be any substantial increase in handover delay as 
compared to standard FMIPv6 protocol. Results are presented. Exact time 
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measurement were based on Timestamps displayed on linux console 
provided by FMIPv6 suite when it  was running in debug mode along with 
a packet sniffing tool, Wireshark.  
4.4.3  Test Scenario  
There are two scenarios in  which a mobile node performs handover.  
Either it‟s anticipated which is called predicative or it‟s unanticipated 
which is called reactive handover.  
4.4.4  Reactive Handovers  
MN performs a Reactive handover when MN is not able to predict 
handover because of sudden drop/loss of signal from its attached AR. In 
such handover, a long service disruption time is expected because MN 
would perform scanning and after completion of scanning it  would try to 
attach to one of the available access points. The scanning proc ess takes 
about 1.3-5 seconds depending on available channels and access points. 
For all  the reactive handover testing, mobile node was forced to change its 
point of attachment from one AR to another by shutting down the wireless 
interfaces of pAR. 
4.4.5  Predictive Handovers  
A predictive handover is performed when MN is able to anticipate a 
handover. This prediction is triggered when signal strength of an 
associated link drops below a certain threshold. In such a situation, MN 
moves to AR with highest signal str ength from the last scan. For all 
predictive handover testing, MN was attached to one of the access router 
and then the Tx power of this access router was reduced, forcing it  to 
move to nAR. 
In both test scenarios, MN streams video from CN based on RTP pro tocol. 
RTP transport protocol was used to avoid the TCP retransmission that 
could affect the actual results.  Buffering was disabled on Video client to 
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be able to perceive the handovers in the actual streaming. Data was 
collected on MN by WireShark. Timesta mps were generated by FMIPv6 
daemon. 
4.4.6  Reactive Handover Test  
In the reactive handover testing  MN was connected to one of the AR and 
then while MN was streaming video, the wireless interface of that AR was 
switched off.  Link failure was detected by MADWiFi  drivers through 
missing beacons. Default value set in drivers was 7 beacons. In 802.11 the 
beacon interval is set to 100ms. So the device drivers detected the link 
loss after 700ms.  The fmip daemon detected the link lost after another 
350 ms and then it  initiated the L2 handover. If fmip daemon had already 
completed the scan, i t  would try to connect to AR with highest signal 
strength. If there was no scan done before the link loss, the daemon would 
start a scan and would make to list of candidate access r outer. After 
establishing L2 connectivity, MN sent an FNA to nAR followed by FBU to 
pAR.   
The experiment was repeated many time but the results were not 
consistent.  Main reason for this lack of consistency in results is that the 
latest Linux kernel 2.6.23-rc3 is not capable of performing optimal L2 
handover. Sometimes it  very fast and sometimes it  is not that fast.  In 
future kernel releases, it  has been noted that this problem will  be 
resolved. As shown in Figure 4.7, it  takes roughly 3 -4 seconds to complete 
a reactive handover.  This Figure represents a typical reactive handover. 
From the Figure it  can be seen that t ime from when the interface of pAR 
was turned off to the time when  actual sending of BU from MN to HA 
varies between 2.5-4 seconds. In this figure time between when pAR 
interface was turn off to the time when link loss was declared MADWiFi 
driver was about 700ms. This link lost was detected by FMIPv6 daemon in 
about 350ms. Once this was detected by FMIPv6 daemon it  starts 
scanning. This scanning  time depends on a number of factors which are 
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discussed later in this chapter. Finally when L2 link is up, BU is sent to 
HA. This time varies from 1ms-9ms. Table 4.2 gives the testbed results.  
 
 
Figure 4 .7:  Handover Delay for React ive Mode  
 
This experiment was repeated multiple times and the timestamps are listed 
in Table 4.2. In this table average L2 scan time is 2.7 second. This is 
because all  the available channels of 802.11a/b/g card were scanned. If all  
the channels of 802.11b were scanned, this scan time would be around 
400ms. This could significantly reduce the handover latency.  
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  RUN         Average 
Latency (ms) 1 2 3 4 5   
       
Link Loss 
Declaration by 
MadWiFi 785 734 789 738 721 753.4 
Link Loss Detection 
by FMIPv6 351 362 373 341 336 352.6 
L2 Scan time 2531 2621 1810 3124 3421 2701.4 
BU sent to HA 2 4 1 9 8 4.8 
Total Latency 3669 3721 2973 4212 4486 3812.2 
Table 4.2:  Testbed Results  
4.4.7  Predictive Handover Test   
The predictive handover of FMIPv6 is the most desirable part of the 
protocol. Handovers performed in this mode are almost seamless with 
minimum packet loss and service disruption time. Video streaming 
application was tested and there was just a glitch in the stream.  In 
predictive mode, MN performed regular scans and whenever it  detected 
that the SNR threshold has been reache d it  performed a handover. First  
MN sent HKreq to pAR. On receiving this HKreq, pAR sent SIReq 
message to Authentication Server which replied with SIres. Once this 
message was received by pAR it  sent an HKRes message to MN. Using 
Ethernet link between  two ARs, MN sent HKreq to nAR. On receiving 
this message, nAR sent SIReq to Authentication Server which was 
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acknowledged with SIres. Once this SIres message was received by nAR, 
it  sent HKRes message to MN using the Ethernet link between nAR and 
pAR. While MN is connected to pAR it  sent an FBU message to pAR. 
Next, pAR sent  HI message to nAR. In response to HI message HAck 
message was sent to pAR and this was acknowledged with FBAck message 
by pAR. At this point MN actually established the L2 connectivity wit h 
nAR which takes about 16ms. The final message sent by MN is FNA to 
nAR. 
Figure 4.8 shows the timers associated with Predictive handover. It  takes 
about 16ms for a handover to complete.  In the Figure, MN either has two 
interfaces, one for scanning and one for actual communication or fmip 
daemon has already performed the scanni ng.  
 
 
Figure 4 .8:  Handover Delay for Predict ive Mode  
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In situations where MN does not have dual interface or if it  has not 
already performed scanning then there would be an added scanning time 
which would be about 1.3 second.  
4.4.8  Impact of Scanning on Handover  
FMIPv6 does not provide a way for MN to discover candidate access 
router.  By sending an RtSolPr to pAR, MN only requests the MAC 
addresses of Candidate access router. It  doesn‟t tell  MN if it  is in the 
range of any of the Candidate access route. The only way for MN to 
discover a suitable AR is to perform periodic scanning.  
During the tests i t  is observed that the scanning process takes about 1.5 -
3.5 seconds depending on the type of wireless card used and t he scanning 
procedures employed. Two different types of cards were tested. One was 
capable of 802.11a/b/g and other was capable of 802.11b/g. For the first  
one, scanning process would normally take up 15.2 seconds and the other 
one would take about 2.7 seconds. After modifying MadWiFi drivers and 
setting the MaxChannelTime, scan time was decreased to 4.7s and 1.3 
seconds respectively.  
In case of reactive handovers, if MN has not previously performed 
scanning, after receiving SIres from pAR, the wireless car d would go in 
scanning phase. During scanning, there is a significant packet loss in case 
of heavy traffic. Video streaming was used for testing and whenever MN 
would perform a scan, there was either a pause or glitch in the video. One 
way to resolve this issue is to have two wireless cards in MN. One for 
scanning and the other one for actual data communication.  However,  this 
is not an optimal solution.  
4.4.9  Comparison of FMIPv6 with Secure FMIPv6  
In reference [42], authors have achieved a handover time of 1 0.42 ms for 
predictive mode. On our testbed the standard time for same scenario was 
12.2ms. Reason for this stems  from the fact that author modified wireless 
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card‟s firmware which was not done for this testbed. Our secure FMIPv6 
predictive handover had a latency of about 14ms. The delay was mainly 
because all  the messages exchanged were secure. Secure message creation 
and its validation at the other end requires some computations which takes 
time. Overall ,  the overhead for added security is 2ms. If the fir mware was 
modified, these delays may drop to 12.22ms.  
 
Figure 4 .9:  Secure vs un-secure FMIPv6 
In Figure 4.9, a comparison of secure and un -secure FMIPv6 is presented.  
The data for un-secure FMIPv6 timings was collected from testbed with 
the added security. The data for secure FMIPv6 was collected from the 
testbed developed at Brunel University. In this chart,  there is difference of 
about 2ms between the secure and un-secure FMIPv6. With overhead of 
just 2ms,  it  has been proved that FMIPv6 can be secured without adding 
any significant delay. Even for most demanding applications, this 2ms 
delay would not be a problem at all.  
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4.5 Improved Handover Anticipation 
A handover is considered a failed-handover when MN initiates handover 
with one AP and moves into the coverage area of another AP. In such 
situations, MN will  not be able to benefit  from FMIPv6, and its handover 
latency would be more than even the standard MIPv6 handovers. Later in 
this section it  has been proven with the help of mathematical analysis that 
non-optimal selection of AP results in significantly high probability of 
failed-handovers. Consider the situation in Figure 4.2 where MN moves 
from AP-A to AP-D. During this movement MN may enter an area called  
“overlap zone”. In this zone, SNR values for all  APs will  be almost equal 
and MN can select any of the AP to handover to. At this point,  if MN 
selects AP-C for handover and actually move to AP-D then the handover 
will be classified as failed handover.  Wh enever MN enters an overlapping 
zone which is covered by two or more APs there is a probability of failed -
handover.   
4.5.1  Probability of failed handover  
 
To calculate the probability of wrong anticipation or failed handover the 
mobility of MN is modelled using  two mobility models; Chiang‟s mobility 
model [68] and random walk mobility model [68]. First  we consider 
Chiang‟s mobility model to calculate the probability of failed handover.  
Chiang‟s mobility model utilizes a probability matrix to determine the 
position of a particular MN in the next time step, which is represented by 
three different states for position on x-axis and three different states for 
position on y-axis .  State 0 represents the current position of a given MN, 
state 1 and state 2 represent two possible transitional states.  
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The probability matrix P(a ,b) is used where each entry represents the 
probability that an MN will  go  from state a to state b. The values within 
this matrix are used for predicting MN‟s location in next step on both x-
axis and y-axis .   
In Chiang‟s simulator each node moves randomly with a constant speed. 
The following matrix contains the values Chiang use d to calculate x and y 
movements:  
 
 
 
Figure 4 .10:  State Transit ion Diagram 
These values are illustrated via a state transition diagram of Figure 4.10. 
With the values defined, an MN may take a step in any of the nine 
possible directions (i .e. ,  i .e.  north, south, east,  west,  north -west,  south-
west,  south-east,  and stay) as long as  it  continues to move (i .e. ,  no pause 
time). At the same time, the probability of MN continuing to follow the 
same direction is higher than the probability of MN changing directions. 
Lastly, the values defined prohibit  movements between the previous and 
next positions without passing through the current location. This 
Chapter 4                       Fast and Secure Handover in FMIPv6 
_____________________________________________________________ 
118 
 
implementation produces probabilistic rather than purely random 
movements, which may yield more realistic behaviors. For example, as 
people complete their daily tasks they tend to continue mov ing in a semi-
constant forward direction. Rarely do we suddenly turn around to retrace 
our steps, and we almost never take random steps hoping that we may 
eventually end up somewhere relevant to our tasks. However, choosing 
appropriate values of P(a ,b) may prove difficult,  if not impossible, for 
individual simulations unless traces are available for a given movement 
scenario.  
 
Figure 4 .11:  MN Possible States  
For analysis,  MN is initially located in the overlapping area as shown in 
Figure 4.11.  MN randomly chooses one of initial  states with the same 
probability and then changes to one of four next states as in Figure 4.11. 
It  is assumed that handover will  be successful only if MN moves to 
coverage area of AP-B otherwise it  fails.  
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First handover success probability (Ps) is calculated and then handover 
failure probability (Pf) is calculated according to MNs initial and its  
transition probability. Table 4.3 shows the analysis results of Ps and Pf.   
 
Table 4.3:  Ps and Pf in different states  
 
 
Figure 4 .12:  Ratio of  Successful and Failed Handovers  
State(0,0) Ps Pf State(0,1) Ps Pf State(0,2) Ps Pf
State(1,1) 0 0.25 State(1,1) 0 0.35 State(1,0) 0 0.15
State(1,2) 0 0.25 State(2,1) 0.35 0 State(1,2) 0 0.35
State(2,1) 0.25 0 State(1,0) 0 0.15 State(2,0) 0.1125 0.0375
State(2,2) 0 0.25 State(2,0) 0.1125 0.0375 State(2,2) 0 0.35
State(1,0) Ps Pf State(1,1) Ps Pf State(1,2) Ps Pf
State(1,2) 0 0.35 State(0,0) 0.0675 0.0225 State(0,0) 0.065 0.0225
State(1,1) 0 0.35 State(1,0) 0 0.21 State(1,0) 0 0.21
State(0,1) 0.1125 0.0375 State(1,1) 0 0.49 State(1,2) 0 0.49
State(0,2) 0 0.15 State(0,1) 0.158 0.053 State(0,2) 0 0.21
State(2,0) Ps Pf State(2,1) Ps Pf State(2,2) Ps Pf
State(0,1) 0.1125 0.0375 State(0,0) 0.0675 0.0225 State(0,0) 0.0675 0.0225
State(0,2) 0 0.15 State(0,1) 0.158 0.053 State(0,0) 0 0.21
State(2,1) 0.35 0 State(2,1) 0.49 0 State(0,0) 0 0.21
State(2,2) 0 0.35 State(2,0) 0.158 0.053 State(0,0) 0 0.49
Chapter 4                       Fast and Secure Handover in FMIPv6 
_____________________________________________________________ 
120 
 
Once the mathematical analysis was concluded, this analysis is compar ed 
with simulation results. In simulation, this probabilistic version of random 
walk was simulated with sample size of 1000. Figure 4.12 shows the 
comparison of simulation and analysis results.  In these results, the 
simulation result  closely resembles the analysis results.  In simulation, 292 
handovers were successful and a staggering 708 handover where failed 
handovers which can be translated as 29.2% success rate.  
Next, the probability of failed handover is calculated using a modified 
version of Chiang‟s mobility model. Chiang‟s mobility relies on the fact  
that MN movement is not fully random; instead it  is a directed movement. 
That is why in state transition diagram of Figure 4.10, the probability of 
maintaining its current state is higher. If th e value of probability matrix is 
changed such that MN can move in to any state with equal probability, it  
will  become a special case of Random walk model. Since the movement of 
MN will  only depend on its current state rather than previous state. Thus 
model of random walk can be classified as Markov Process.  
The state transition diagram is il lustrated in Figure 4.13. State 0 
represents the current position of a given MN, state 1 and state 2 represent 
two possible transitional states.  With combination if ea ch x and y states 
there are total of nine possible states (i.e.  north, south, east,  west, north -
west,  south-west,  south-east,  and stay)as il lustrated in Figure 4.13. For the 
purpose of keeping analysis simple the speed of MN is assumed to be 
constant.   
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Figure 4 .13:  State Transit ion Diagram 
To keep the analysis coherent with the previous analysis, identical test 
conditions are created. MN is initially located in the overlapping area  of 
the coverage network as in Figure 4.11. Then MN chooses one of initial  
nine states with the same probability and then changes to one of the four 
possible states. It  is assumed that initially MN was connected to AP -C 
(pAR) and then moves to AP-B (nAR) at once. In this case, handover 
succeeds only if MN actually moves to AP-B otherwise it  fails. The 
probability of successful handover (Ps) and probability of a failed 
handover (Pf) is calculated based on the state transition diagram of Figure 
4.13. Table 4.4 shows the analysis results of Ps and Pf.  
Once the mathematical analysis is concluded, it  is compared with 
simulation where this random walk model was simulated with sample size 
of 1000. Figure 4.14 shows the comparison of simulation and analysis 
results.  In simulation, 340 handovers were successful and 660 handovers 
were failed handovers which can be translated as 34% success rate.  
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Table 4.4:  Ps and Pf in different states  
 
 
Figure 4 .14:Ratio  of  Successful and Failed Handovers  
State(0,0) Ps Pf State(0,1) Ps Pf State(0,2) Ps Pf
State(1,1) 0 0.25 State(1,1) 0 0.25 State(1,0) 0 0.25
State(1,2) 0 0.25 State(2,1) 0.25 0 State(1,2) 0 0.25
State(2,1) 0.25 0 State(1,0) 0 0.25 State(2,0) 0.1875 0.0625
State(2,2) 0 0.25 State(2,0) 0.1875 0.0625 State(2,2) 0 0.25
State(1,0) Ps Pf State(1,1) Ps Pf State(1,2) Ps Pf
State(1,2) 0 0.25 State(0,0) 0.1875 0.0625 State(0,0) 0.1875 0.0625
State(1,1) 0 0.25 State(1,0) 0 0.25 State(1,0) 0 0.25
State(0,1) 0.1875 0.0625 State(1,1) 0 0.25 State(1,2) 0 0.25
State(0,2) 0 0.25 State(0,1) 0.1875 0.0625 State(0,2) 0 0.25
State(2,0) Ps Pf State(2,1) Ps Pf State(2,2) Ps Pf
State(0,1) 0.1875 0.0625 State(0,0) 0.1875 0.0625 State(0,0) 0.1875 0.0625
State(0,2) 0 0.25 State(0,1) 0.1875 0.0625 State(0,0) 0 0.25
State(2,1) 0.25 0 State(2,1) 0.25 0 State(0,0) 0 0.25
State(2,2) 0 0.25 State(2,0) 0.1875 0.0625 State(0,0) 0 0.25
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4.5.2  Proposed Scheme for Next AP selection  
 
Based on previous three locations of MN, the next position of MN can be 
predicted with reasonable certainty.  Using “curve fitt ing” schemes, the 
equation of the MN trajectory can be derived from previous three values. 
By simply incrementing the values of either x or y variable in this 
equation, next possible location of MN can be predicated.  
Since the proposed scheme utilizes MN‟s current position and location of 
APs. There are two possibilities to make this information available to MN. 
One possibility is that MN should be fitted with GPS receiver and co -
ordinates of APs should be available to MN in the form of an offline 
database. Problems with thi s approach is that extra load is put on MN 
battery (constant running GPS receiver) and maintaining a potentially 
huge database. The other possibility is that the required information 
should be supplied by the network. The second option is preferred because  
it  is easier to implement and does not put extra load on MN battery.  
To provide the location information to MN, following changes to the 
network are required.  
 All Access Points must have the same coverage area.  
 All Access Points should broadcast there ge ographical co-ordinates 
based as part of their SSID 
An example of such coverage area is illustrated in figure 4.15. There are 
16 APs in this figure and their co -ordinates are illustrated in the figure. 
When MN is connected to any of the access point,  the M N will know its 
geographic location based on SSID of connected AP. MN location 
information is only accurate to coverage area of AP but for scheme to 
work, this information is enough.  
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Figure 4 .15:  AP deployment scheme 
 
In current FMIPv6 when L2 trigger of Link going down is received, MN 
goes into active scanning mode where it  scans all  available channels. Once 
the scan is completed, the AP with highest SNR value is selected. There is 
a good chance the MN will  actually move to a different access point rather 
than the one with highest SNR.  
 
Figure 4 .16:  AP coverage area with overlapping zone  
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Consider  network deployment as shown in Figure 4.16. There are four 
APs and all  of them have equal transmission range. The range at which 
“link going down” trigger is generated by MN, is shown by blue circles. 
Consider a situation where MN is connected to  AP (1,1) and it  is moving 
in the direction of AP (2,2). Now when MN crosses the boundary of blue 
circle, L2 trigger will be generated and MN will go into scanning mode. 
At the end of the scan, MN will  either select AP(1,2) or AP(2,1) because 
they are closer to MN position so they should have higher SNR value as 
compared to AP(2,2).  In fact,  it  is very clear that MN is moving in the 
direction of AP(2,2), and MN should select AP(2,2)  its next AP.  In such 
situation, MN will  select a wrong AP. With the prop osed scheme MN will 
have a „sense of direction‟ and will  select the correct AP. This „sense of 
direction‟ is based on MN‟s current location and uniformity of cell 
coverage plan. The location of MN is the geographical coordination of its 
active AP. Based on previous three locations MN, can predict its next 
location or coordinates of next AP. This prediction is explained in section 
4.5.3.  
The proposed scheme is now explained with help of a flow chart of figure 
4.17. In this flow chart,  when „link going down‟  trigger is received, MN 
will check if it  has a handover history from previous handovers. MN only 
needs three handovers to predict its next location. If there is no history 
available, MN will perform standard FMIPv6 procedures in which it will  
start active scanning and after completion of scan, AP with highest SNR 
will be selected. If MN has the previous history, MN will  predict the 
coordinates of next AP. At this stage, MN will  check if it  has detected the 
presence of predicted AP from a passive scan, and if found then predicted 
AP will be selected as the new AP and handover procedures can initiate. If 
predicted AP is not found, MN will  start  active scanning and at the very 
instant MN detects the predicted AP it  will  terminate scanning and will 
initiate handover. If MN fails to find the predicted AP, it  means that an 
error has occurred and the prediction was wrong. At this stage, MN will  
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fallback to standard FMIPv6 procedures; complete the scan and select AP 
with highest SNR. 
 
Figure 4 .17:  Flow Chart for the AP Select ion  
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4.5.3  Estimation of next AP co-ordinates: 
Using “curve fit ting” schemes, the equation of MN trajectory can be 
derived from previous three values. Simply incrementing the value of 
either x or y variable in this equation, next value can be predicated. To 
explain the procedures for cure fitting, first  linear curve fit ting scheme, 
also called as linear regression is explained. Consider figure with four 
data points. If we have to pick the coefficients th at best fit  the line to 
data?  Blue line makes a particular straight line and is a „good‟ fit  for the 
following reasons:  
 
Figure 4 .18:  Linear Curve Fitt ing  
 Consider the distance between the data point and th e line. 
 This distance is an expression of the „error‟ between data and fit ted 
line. 
 The line that provides the minimum error is then the „best‟ fit  l ine.  
Error in a curve fit:  
To quantify error, it  is assumed that positive and negative errors have 
same value and higher errors have big impact. In term of Mathematics, if 
we square the error values, the same effect can be achieved.  
2
44
2
33
2
22
2
11
2 ))(())(())(())(()( xfyxfyxfyxfyderr i  
Chapter 4                       Fast and Secure Handover in FMIPv6 
_____________________________________________________________ 
128 
 
The fit  is straight line, so now substitute baxxf )(  
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The „best‟ line has minimum error between line and data points. This is 
called the least squares approach, since the square of error is minimized.  
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Take the derivate of the error with respect to  and ,  set each to zero.  
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Solve for  and  so that the previous two equation both =0  
These two can be re-written as 
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Only this unknown is value of a  and b .  
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Options to solve this equation are either matrix inverse or Gaussian 
Elimination.  
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or
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Polynomial Curve Fitting:  
Consider Figure 4.19. In this figure, there is a trend in data points.  Rather 
than using a straight line, a smooth curve can pass through these data 
point.  
 
Figure 4 .19:  Polynomial Curve Fitt ing  
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 The general equation of a polynomial is as follow.  
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Similar to linear regression, the best fit ting curve is the one there the 
error is minimum.  
The general expression for any error using the least square approach is  
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Where n  is number of data points,  is the current data point being 
summed and j  is the order of polynomial.  
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To find is the best fitt ing polynomial,  this equation should be minimized.  
Taking derivative with respect to each coefficient 0
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So 
BAX
or
BAX
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Options to solve this equation are either matrix inverse or Gaussian 
Elimination.  
Consider the example of Figure 4.20. In this Figure there are 12 APs. 
Initially MN was in coverage area of AP -A then it  moved to coverage area 
of AP-B and later on it  move in to coverage area of AP -G. Using this 
location history, next possible  AP can be predicted. If curve fit ting 
techniques are applied to MN previous locations then the equation of a 
polynomial that is a „best fit‟ for tracking its trajectory can be derived.  
 
Figure 4 .20:  Next  AP select ion in MATLAB 
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In the figure two equations that are possible candidates for MN trajectory 
are derived.  
 
 
First  equation is first  order polynomial represented by red line in the 
figure.  Second equation is a second ord er polynomial and is represented 
by blue line in figure 4.20. From visible inspection it is obvious that blue 
is much better than the red line.   
When MN is in AP-G its coordinates are (2.5,7.5) which are actually the 
coordinates of AP-G. If we increment the values of x by one step and put 
its equation.   
 
 
Now the possible coordinates with incrementing x are (3.5, 17.5).  This 
location is coverage range of AP-P and MN cannot directly move to AP-P 
for AP-G. 
Now if we increment the value of y and pit  i t  in equation  
  
Solving it  for value of x  
 
So the possible co-ordinates with incrementing y are (3.05, 12.5). These 
coordinates are in coverage area of AP-L, so AP-L will  be selected as the 
next access point for handover.  
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4.5.4  Evaluation of the scheme 
 
For performance evaluation of this scheme, a simulation in Matlab was 
run. For this simulation, human mobility tracers were sourced from one 
thousand hours of GPS traces in various outdoor settings including college 
campuses, theme parks and metropolitan cities, were available. This data 
contains x-y coordinates of voluntaries from a fixed reference point.  Data 
collection interval is every 30 seconds. Average walking speed of human 
during a normal walk is 1.2 meters per second], so in 30 seconds humans 
can cover distance of 36 meters. Because of this,  the coverage area of an 
AP for this simulation was selected as 50m.  
 
Figure 4 .21:  Ratio of  Successful and Failed Handover s 
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The data from different locations including Disney world (theme park),  
New York City (metropolitan city),  KAIST (campus) and NCSU (campus) 
was tested in simulation as the results are shown in Figure 4.21.  
In this Figure 4.21, the ratio of successful and failed handovers is 
il lustrated. In case of Disney work, 60% of the handovers are successful. 
In case of New York City, 62% handovers are successful.  In case of 
KAIST and NCSU campuses, 65% of all  handovers are successful.  In 
contrast to mobility models  where the success rate was 30-35%, the 
success rate in case of proposed scheme is 60 -65%. 
From these results,  it  can be concluded that the proposed scheme provides 
a higher success rate.  
4.6 Chapter Summary 
In the chapter i t  has been proved that adding secur ity to FMIPv6 will  not 
adversely affect FMIPv6 in any possible way. It  is still  fast and secure. 
During our experimentation on actual testbed, a seamless handover is 
observed despite all this added security. In case of reactive handover, the 
latency was between 2.5-4 seconds. Major contribution to this delay was 
from the scanning time which was between 1.8 -3.4 seconds. In case of 
predictive handover, this time was about 16 -17ms without including the 
scanning phase. In addition to added security, a novel sch eme to assist 
MN in selection of optimal AP is also presented. This optimal AP 
selections scheme can increase the success rate of handover from 30 -35% 
to 65%.  
There is one major issue in the protocol which is not addressed. This is 
Candidate Access Router  Discovery. The only way to discover Candidate 
Access Router is by scanning. This scanning time is the longest delay in 
overall  handover. One possible approach that was adopted is to use two 
wireless interfaces on MN; one interface for scanning and one for  actual 
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data communication. Another possible solution could be to use 802.21 
information sever for Candidate Access Router discover.  
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Chapter 5 
 
 
 
5  Communication Path Reliability  
 
These days multiple interfaces like WiFi, Bluetooth, GSM and 3G are 
almost standard on all  Personal Digital Devices. Aim of all these 
interfaces is to keep the device connected to any of the available access 
technologies.  
One of the benefits of having mul tiple interfaces is that when active, they 
provide multiple communication paths between Mobile Node and the 
Corresponding Node. If there is failure on one path, Mobile Node can 
switch to an alternate path by switching its communicating interface. The 
switch from one interface to another causes service disruption. For many 
real-time applications this is undesirable.  
When Mobile Node running Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) [6] is equipped with 
multiple interfaces belonging to distinct access technologies, it  is said to 
be multi-homed. The performance of a particular access technology may 
vary throughout a single communication session. If signal strength on a 
particular interface used for communication deteriorates beyond 
acceptable value, reliability becomes an issue. Th ere needs to be a 
mechanism to quickly detect the failure and switch the traffic from failing 
communication path/interface to a different one.  
This chapter presents a solution that can quickly detect path failures 
between Mobile Node and Corresponding Node s. At the same time, i t  
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provides a mechanism to automatically switch its active interface without 
any service disruption.  
5.1 Introduction 
Future of communication networks lies in the integration of different 
access technologies. This is probably the reason wh y more and more 
devices that support multiple interfaces are hitt ing today‟s market.   Aim 
of having multiple interfaces on a single device is to keep it  connected to 
any of the available access technologies. One of the benefits of having 
multi-interfaced device is to allow users to access multiple networks 
simultaneously and to manage mobility among them. Multiple active 
interfaces provide multiple communication paths between the Mobile 
Node and Corresponding Node. If there is a problem on path associated 
with one access technology, Mobile Node can switch to an alternate path 
by switching its active interface thus increasing reliability of 
communication session.  
As the technology matures there are still  many un -resolved issues with 
this interface switching. One of the most prominent issue is to enable 
session continuity during switching.  
In IP based networks, mobility support is provided through MIPv6 [6].  
Movement of a Mobile Node is hidden from upper layers through the use 
of two addresses. A permanent address in its home network called its 
Home Address and a temporary address in the visited network called Care 
of Address. Binding between these two addresses is kept in a router called 
a Home Agent. Hence it  provides a level of indirection at the network to 
keep the address change transparent to Upper Layer Protocols (ULPs). 
When MN is away from its home network, packets are still  sent to its 
HoA.  HA intercepts these packets and tunnels them to the CoA.  
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An IP based Mobile communication can fail  when there i s a path failure 
between MN and CN. In MIPv6 when such failures take place, MN doesn‟t 
receive any indication. It ,  however, loses any connections routed through 
that interface. A situation in which there are multiple interfaces on MN, 
communication can be resumed by switching to another interface. 
Although some extensions of MIPv6 aim to reduce horizontal handoff 
latency, they all  suffer from the fact that communication sessions break 
when the switch is made from one interface to another. In this chapter, a  
quick interface switching mechanism in multi -homed MIPv6 environment 
is proposed. This proposal ensures session survivability across outages. 
When MN is Multi -homed through multiple access networks, each 
interface corresponds to one of these networks. An MN thus has multiple 
CoAs.  
Our approach is based on Site Multihoming with IPv6 Intermediation 
(SHIM6). However in place of locators, MN‟s HoA and CoAs are utilized. 
Main advantage of this is if path through one of the interfaces fails 
communication could continue using a different interface.  Conceptually a 
SHIM6 sub layer is added above MIPv6.  The locator set for MN consists 
of HoA and CoAs formed by appending the advertised prefixes with 
Interface Identifiers. Mapping between HoA and CoA is kept in MIPv 6 
layer.  One of the HoAs or CoAs is used as an Upper Layer Identifier 
(ULID) of MN when communicating with a CN. In case this ULID 
becomes unreachable, communication can switch to a different interface 
by mapping the ULID pair to a different locator pair.  Hence the locator 
switch is hidden from ULPs resulting in continuity of sessions. A SHIM6 
state is maintained between MN and CN.  During initial context 
establishment phase, a set of locators is exchanged between the 
communicating entities. This phase is also used to signal that both ends of 
communication support SHIM6.  
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5.2 Related Work  
In research community, session survivability issue has been addressed at 
different layers of OSI models. Some are network layer solution like 
Shim6, HIP and LIN6, some are t ransport layer like SCTP and some are 
application layer solutions like SIP. In this section the above -mentioned 
solutions are analyzed and it is concluded that none of them fully satisfies 
the requirement of having multiple active interfaces while supporti ng 
seamless interface switching in a mobile environment.  
5.2.1  Network Layer Proposals  
In an IP based network IP address serves two purposes. It  can be viewed 
as identifying a node (identifier) and also specifying the location of that 
node in the internet (locator).  As IPv6 based networks allow a single 
device to have more than one globally routable IP address, this can lead to 
an undesirable situation where IP addresses can be taken to be serving as 
both identifiers and locators. Consider for instance a situatio n where a 
device has multiple interface and unique IP address on each interface. 
Such a device is said to be multi -homed. When another device on internet 
wants to communicate with this device it  views this device as having 
several identities as well as locations (IP address) which is actually not 
the case. The idea behind this class of proposals is to employ a mapping 
function in the network between an identifier and a set of locators such 
that transport layer protocols see them as single device.  
5.2.1.1  Host Identity Protocol (HIP):   
HIP was first  introduced in 2003 in an internet draft document [49]. In the 
protocol cryptographic identifiers called Host Identity Tags are used at 
application layer [50]. These tags are mapped to multiple locators at HIP 
sub layer (layer 3.5) which is in troduced between transport and IP layer. 
HIT is 128-bit  hash value of the host -identifier presented to the transport 
layer. Initial HIP draft didn‟t support multi -homing as it  only allowed 
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hosts to use the same IP addresses which communicating peers exchan ged 
during initial HIP exchange. An extension to the original draft [51] 
allowed hosts to change their IP address during communication.  
 
Figure 5 .1:HIP protocol  
When a host wishes to change its IP address, it  informs its peers through 
HIP Readdress packet.  Peer checks reach ability of the host by sending 
back HIP address check packet and subsequently host replies with Address 
Check Reply Packet.  Hence the scheme suggests that transport layer 
sockets are not bound to IP addresses but instead are bound to 
cryptographic identifiers (HIT) resulting in dynamic changes to IP 
addresses during a communication session.  
HIP protocol signaling exchange is given in  Figure 5.1. 
5.2.1.2  LIN 6:  
An idea was presented in “LIN6: a solution to mobility and multi -homing 
in IPv6 [52]”.  Although the solution addresses both mobility and multi -
homing in IPv6, the focus of research is  on how the proposal tackles 
multi-homing problem.  
Chapter 5                       Communication Path Reliability  
_____________________________________________________________ 
142 
 
LIN6 introduces two types of IPv6 addresses LIN6 generalized ID and 
LIN6 address. LIN6 generalized ID is a 128 -bit  long address which 
identifies a node in the transport and upper layers. An ID is assigned to 
the node and is known as LIN6 generalized ID.  Application programs use 
LIN6 generalized ID to indicate target node whereas TCP establishes TCP 
connection between two LIN6 generalized ID.  
LIN6 generalized ID consists of a 64 bit  LIN6 prefix which is a 
predefined constant value and a 64 bits LIN6 ID which uniquely identifies 
node in the internet.  
LIN6 address is also 128 bit  long and is composed of 64bit network prefix 
and a 64bit LIN6 ID. Network prefix indicates the subnet to which the 
node is connected. It  is attached to the head of LIN6 ID to construct LIN6 
address. Hence LIN6 address identifies both the node and its point of 
attachment to the internet.  With this approach, if a host changes its subnet 
only the network prefix part of LIN6 address has to  be changed. 
Furthermore, this change doesn‟t affect existing TCP connections as they 
use LIN6 generalized IDs. The mapping between LIN6 ID and the network 
prefix is maintained in Mapping Agents (MAs). When a host changes its 
subnet i t  must inform its MA of the change. This is done through mapping 
update and reply messages. The record of hosts and their mapping agents 
are kept in DNS. 
To illustrate how LIN6 solves multi -homing problem we refer to  Figure 
5.2 .  In the figure hosts A and B have LIN6 generalized IDs “LIN6_P + 
ID_A” and “LIN6_P +ID_B” respectively. Host B is a multi -homed host 
having two network interfaces. LIN6 address of host A is “P_A + ID _A” 
where P_A is the network prefix of node A, where for host B LIN6 
addresses are “P_B1  + ID_B” and “P_B2  + ID_B” were “P_B1” and “P_B2” 
are the network prefixes corresponding to the two interfaces. Assume host 
A wants to communicate with host B. A TCP co nnection is established 
using the two LIN6 generalized addresses. If host A becomes aware of the 
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two network prefixes of host B and chooses “P_B 1” for communication the 
source and destination addresses in IPv6 header would become “P_A + 
ID_A” and “P_B1  + ID_B” respectively. Now assume that the connection 
of host B to its network prefix “P_B 1” breaks. Host A would receive ICMP 
unreachable error.  It  can then choose “P_B 2” as the new destination 
prefix.  
 
Figure 5 .2:   LIN6 
5.2.1.3  Multi-homing without IP Identifiers (NOID):  
Multi-homing without IP Identifiers [65] introduces a Shim layer between 
the IP layer and upper layers. The proposal uses DNS system for 
verification and to prevent redirection attacks. As opposed  to layer 3 Shim 
approach which uses identifiers as ULIDs, NOID proposes Application 
Level IDs (AIDs) to be mapped to/from different locators.  In order to 
perform this mapping M6 Shim layer maintains state called host -pair 
context.  Mapping is performed consistently at both the sender and the 
receiver. Upper Layer Protocols (ULPs) see packets being sent using AIDs 
from end to end, whereas actually packets are sent through the network 
between locators.  
When host A wants to communicate with host B it  sends a  request to DNS 
to resolve Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) of host B. DNS replies 
with FQDN along with a set of locators associated with this FQDN. 
Context establishment phase consists of 4 -way hand shake in which host A 
can learn of the set of host B‟s  locators. This set is compared with the 
record from DNS and is verified by performing forward and reverse DNS 
lookups for each FDQN-locator pair. After the context establishment 
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phase, any combination of valid locators can be used. M6 Shim layer 
performs the mapping between locator sets and AID.  AID is usually 
chosen to be the first  record sent by DNS from the original FQDN lookup.  
A main drawback of this approach is that it  requires host to have both 
forward and reverse DNS entries which is sometimes not  comprehensible.  
5.2.1.4  Weak Identifier Multi -homing Protocol (WIMP/WIMP-F): 
Weak Identifier Multi -homing Protocol (WIMP) [64] introduces a wedge 
layer between IP and ULPs. The approach is similar to NOID except that 
non-routable AIDs are used which are not part  of IPv6 headers.  
Before any communication takes place WIMP requires context 
establishment to occur between two hosts. It  uses one way hash chains 
generated by each end host to authenticate messages exchanged. Host 
initiating the context establishment rec eives a set of locators from the 
corresponding host. It  will  then map the locators in IPv6 header and the 
AID. A “tag” is inserted into the IPv6 header to indicate the WIMP 
context state to the receiving host.  Locator sets can be updated after the 
initial context establishment. WIMP is a scheme mainly defined for 
mitigating the security threats for multi -homed host.  It  protects from 
redirection attacks as the host receiving the redirection request can verify 
that the host sending the redirection request hol ds the successor values of 
a hash chain.  
In addition to the above mentioned proposals for locator/identifier split 
some other proposals came forward. One such proposal involved splitting 
the IPv6 address into two 8-byte parts [53]. The least significant 8  bytes 
were used to uniquely identify the interface whereas the most significant 8 
bytes were to encode information about the interface in global internet.  
The proposal met some resistance due to security issues it  raised and had 
to be abandoned.  
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As mentioned earlier,  an important requirement for multi -homed Mobile 
Node with interfaces bound to multiple access technologies is to be able 
to switch between them seamlessly. The above -mentioned network layer 
solutions fail  to fulfill  this requirement. In all t he proposals listed, 
sessions have to be broken and re -started when switch is made from one 
interface/IP address to another.  
5.2.2  Transport Layer Proposals  
In the proposals described in previous subsection, identification problem 
was tackled by hiding IP address changes from transport layer. In the 
transport layer proposal,  the idea is to modify actual transport layer to 
support IP address changes.  
5.2.2.1  Stream Control Transmission Protocol:  
Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) is presented in [54] to 
support the host multi-homing at either end of  connection. Prior to any 
connection taking place a multi -homed host informs a corresponding 
server about all  the IPv6 addresses associated with it  in a message INIT 
chunk‟s address parameters. The server responds wit h INIT_ACK message 
containing all  of its IPv6 addresses. Each IPv6 address is set to 
correspond to a transmission path between the two. One of these IPv6 
addresses is taken to be the primary path that would be used in normal 
circumstances. During communica tions each SCTP connection sends heart 
beat messages to its peer along with all the transmission paths not 
currently used for data. The peers or host respond by heart beat ACK 
chunks.  
Each transmission path has a state: active or inactive [54]. A path is 
active if it  has recently been used and an ACK is received. If ACK 
repeatedly fails the path is deemed inactive.  
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Figure 5 .3:  SCTP Signaling  
 
End to End Multi -homing: 
An approach to modify transport layer (TCP or UDP) or application layer 
protocols is presented in [56]. The idea is to assign multiple addresses to 
an interface and let application or transport layer decide which addresses 
to use. The proposal requires no changes to the routing protocols instead, 
multi-homing support is provided at end systems. TCP changes are 
proposed whereby an application can pass multiple addresses to the 
transport layer. To identify all the addresses of the destination [56] 
proposes to use DNS lookup.  
Although this approach has the advantage that no changes are required in 
existing routing protocols there are many issues left  un -resolved. There is 
no mechanism presented to allow hosts to choose which address to use as 
source address.  There is no explanation as to how an application or 
transport layer reacts to any loss of connectivity. There is also no location 
management entity defined for Mobile Node‟s location.  
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5.2.3  Session Layer Proposals  
There are certain proposals, which support the idea of providing mobility 
management at application layer. These proposals are based on Session 
Initiation Protocol (SIP) [63]. However, there are many flaws with such 
proposals.  
First  of all ,  i t  is difficult  to maintain a long SIP session. These solutio ns 
also require additional equipment such as register servers to be deployed. 
Applications would also require major modifications in order to deploy 
any of these solutions.  
 
5.3 Proposed Architecture  
In order to explain the proposed architecture, its buildin g blocks are 
discussed first .  
 
Overview of Builing Blocks  
 SHIM6:  This is actual protocol that hides IP address changes. This 
protocol was designed to work on Edge routers in networks but with 
some modification, it  is adopted  to work on Mobile Node  
 REAP Protocol :  This protocol is designed to detect any link 
failures in core network. Again some changes have been proposed 
after which it can be used on Mobile Node.  
In the following sub-section, these building blocks are described in 
more detail .  
5.3.1  SHIM6   
In 2004, Multi6 working group within IETF proposed a solution called 
SHIM6 [59] to support multi -homing in IPv6 networks. The proposal 
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introduces a SHIM6 sub layer in the IP stack of end hosts. These hosts 
reside in a multi -homed site where multiple IPv6 network prefixes are 
advertised. This results in more than one IPv6 address for each host. One 
of these addresses is presented to upper layers as Upper Layer ID (ULID). 
When host decides to communicate with a peer, it  initially uses its ULID 
as the source address. Sometime later,  a SHIM6 state can be setup 
between the host and peer. This state is later used to switch to a different 
locator pair should the original ULID pair stop working. SHIM6 approach 
suggests that instead of introducing a new namespace, th e identifier or 
ULID should be chosen from the set of locators. This has an advantage of 
supporting callbacks and referrals in a long communication session.  
Figure 5.4 illustrates where SHIM6 sub layer is added within the protocol 
stack. Conceptually, SHIM6 header is an extension to IPv6 header. It  is 
placed before all  the other extension headers i .e.  AH, E SP, fragmentation 
and destination options header.  
 
Figure 5 .4:  Placement of  SHIM6 sub layer  
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Multi-homed hosts would generally choose a locator as source ULID 
according to default  address selection mechanism  [60] while destination 
ULIDs are generally chosen to be first  locator obtained from DNS server 
through destination host lookup. As will  be discussed later, our scheme 
differs somewhat from this in terms of source ULID selection. As in our 
scheme, the ULID chosen has to be a serving HoA or CoA of the MN. 
After SHIM6 context is established, the communication can fail  over to a 
different locator pair in case the first pair goes down. A locator pair 
selection algorithm is presented in [57].  
When application on a host decides to contact a peer using Upper Layer 
Protocol (ULP), i t  sends packets using IP addresses chosen by Default 
Address Selection mechanism. This is known as initial contact.  At a later 
stage ULPs on either the host initiating contact or the peer  might decide to 
establish a SHIM6 context to make the communication survive locator 
failures. This triggers a four -way SHIM6 context establishment exchange. 
This exchange includes I1, R1, I2, and R2 messages. Details of these 
messages can be found in [59] . A list  of locators to be used by each host 
is exchanged during this phase.  
When a failure takes place SHIM6 failure detection or some other ULP 
layer reach ability detection mechanism will detect it .  SHIM6 uses Forced 
Bidirectional Detection (FBD) mechanism to detect the failure. Once 
failure is detected, one or both ends of communication would start  probing 
for different set of locators. This involves sending probe messages 
containing different locator pairs [58]. When one of these pairs is found to 
be working, SHIM6 rewrites the packets and tags them with SHIM6 
payload extension header. The header contains receiver‟s context tag. 
Context tag is used to identify the context state. It  enables the SHIM6 sub 
layer at receiver to place the right addresses in  IPv6 header before 
forwarding the packets to ULP. This keeps the locator pair changes 
transparent to ULPs.  
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Figure 5 .5:  Shim mapping when locators are changed  
A host can specify locator preferences and com municate them to its peer.  
It  can also indicate any changes in the preferences during communication. 
When a context state is no longer needed, SHIM6 can garbage collect the 
state. A recovery message is defined to indicate that there is no context 
state. In addition, SHIM6 supports context forking where a ULP can 
specify that a context can be forced into two contexts each associated with 
a locator pair.  This is useful when applications running on hosts want to 
use more than one locator pair for communication s. 
5.3.2  REAP Protocol  
REAch ability protocol (REAP) as it  is known, can be divided into two 
processes: a failure detection process and a locator pair exploration 
process. Failure detection can further be divided into three processes. 
These are tracking local information, tracking remote peer‟s information, 
and verifying reach ability. Different metrics can be used to monitor local 
information about addresses such as whether default  router associated 
with them are stil l  reachable, or whether their associated int erfaces are up. 
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Information about remote peer‟s addresses is also necessary.  Update 
messages used in SHIM6 protocol are employed to indicate any changes in 
remote peer‟s address list . Finally, it  is necessary to verify reach ability 
of an address pair. REAP uses a technique called Forced Bidirectional 
Detection (FBD) for this purpose. Reach ability is confirmed when data 
traffic in one direction is complemented by either data traffic, transport 
layer acknowledgements or REAP keep alive messages. The same 
procedures are employed except the value of “keep alive” and “send 
timeout” in our proposal are significantly less than those defined in 
REAP. This is due to the fact that the original protocol was designed for 
site multi-homing where network failures are not frequent. However in 
cases where MN is multi -homed, communication can be disrupted quite 
frequently resulting in regular session break. To avoid this,  timeouts have 
to be re-calculated.  If after transmission of data traffic, a host does not 
receive any return traffic for the duration of send timer, a full  locator pair 
exploration is initiated. Host which first  detects disruption sends probe 
messages using different address pair in turn to its peer indicating state of 
connectivity.  Reception of probe message triggers an identical 
exploration process in the peer. When the host receives probe messages 
back from the peer, it  can conclude that peer has received its probe 
message and that peer‟s probe messages have also got back to the host. 
Hence return routability is inherently supported by REAP. Communicating 
hosts test all the available address pairs until a working pair is found. 
This testing is performed sequentially with exponential back -off.  This 
process again defines two timeouts. An Initial Probe Tim eout, which is the 
interval between initial attempts to send probes and Max Probe Timeout, 
which is the interval after which probe interval doesn‟t grow. In addition, 
the protocol specifies that Initial probes can be sent four times before 
exponential back-off procedure is started.  
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5.4 Test Scenario for the Proposal  
In this section the proposed scheme is explained with help of a generic 
network diagram and a message flow chart.  In Figure 5.6, MN is a multi -
interface device with WiFi and WiMAX interfaces. MN is in coverage area 
of both networks and it is connected to both of them. MN runs one 
instance of MIPv6 and has one HoA, two  CoA (one on each interface) and 
one HA. So it is a multi -homed device.  
MN can communicate with CN using many interfaces. Let‟s consider a 
case that communication with CN is started with HoA on WiFi interface.  
After initial  communication, SHIM6 context i s established with CN by 
exchange of I1, R1, I2 and R2 messages. Once the context is established, 
CN is aware of MN multiple CoAs.  
Now for MN, it  has two paths to communicate with CN and the current 
communication is on path associated with WiFi link. Consi der a situation 
where there is a failure on this path.  Normally in this case, there would 
be communication disruption and MN has to first detect path failure that 
would be when the communication is disrupted and second it  would re -
initiate communication by sending BU to HA with CoA2. But with the 
proposed scheme, this failure would be detected with REAP protocol. 
Once failure is detected by modified REAP protocol running on CN, it 
starts sending probe messages indicating to MN that i t  is not receiving any 
traffic. These probe messages are sent through a different access network 
and using a different locator. MN replies with probe message of its own 
and thus a working address pair is explored. This working pair is set as 
new address pair for communication. SHIM6 sub layer in MN maps the 
ULIDs to this address pair and adds receiver (CN‟s) context tag to the 
packets. This way address change is kept transparent to ULPs.  
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Figure 5 .6:  Mult ihoming scenario for MIPv6 
The original REAP protocol was modified and the timers were adjusted 
according to the Table 5-1. In this table, Send Timeout  represents the 
time after which if keep alive message is not received by any node, it  will 
start  probing for other working locater -pair.  Keep alive  interval of 150ms 
represents that a keep alive message will  be sent very 150ms if there is 
not traffic exchange between two SHIM 6 enabled nodes. Initial Probe 
time  of 200ms represents that when a node sends a probe message, it  will  
wait for 200ms before sending another probe message. The maximum 
probe attempts on a single locater -pair are set to be four and this is 
represented in table by Number of probes .  Final entity in this table is 
Maximum probe timeout  which represents for how long a node can keep 
on exploring a working locater -pair.  Once this timer is exhausted, the 
node will  stop sending probe messages.  
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Send Timeout 500ms 
Keep alive 150ms 
Initial Probe time 200ms 
Number of probes 4 
Maximum probe timeout  2.5s 
Table 5-1:  Modif ied Timers for REAP  
5.5 Actual testbed implementation and Results  
In this section the actual testbed and the results are presented.  In the 
testbed, the proposed mechanism of failure detection and recovery  was 
tested. A multi -interface node was connected to a number of foreign 
networks. It  registered with a home agent f or mobility services. There was 
another node acting as video streaming server.  VMware  visualization 
technology was used to simulate these nodes. All the nodes were based on 
Linux with UMIP for MIPv6 support.  The results were collected by packet 
sniffing tool, WireShark.   
5.5.1  The Testbed  
For testbed development a minimum of four nodes are required. One 
acting as MN, one acting as HA, one acting as CN and one acting as router 
to interconnect different network prefixes. The actual testbed is illustrated 
in Figure 5.7. As drawn in this figure, Mobile Node with three interfaces 
is created. All these interfaces are Fast -Ethernet interfaces. The IP 
addresses assigned to these three interfaces are 2001:660:4701:3::128/64, 
2001:660:4701:4::128/64 and 2001:660:4701:5::128/64. In these IP 
addresses “2001:660:4701:4” part represents the network prefix. So all  the 
interfaces have different network prefixes.  HA had jus t one Fast-Ethernet 
interface with prefix of “2001:660:4701:1” and IP address of 
“2001:660:4701:1::1/64”. Corresponding node was a multi -interface server 
with two fast-Ethernet interface with prefixes of “2001:660:4701:10” and 
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“2001:660:4701:11”.  This CN was acting as video streaming serving 
using VLC software to stream server in either RTP or UDP transport 
mechanism. Finally a Linux based router is required to interconnect 
different network prefixes. It  was running RADVD protocol suit to 
perform routing.  
Instead of using actual machines, VMware visualization technology was 
used to visualize these nodes. In VMware, four virtual machines were 
created and they were interconnected via virtual network. The VMware 
virtualization technology was selected because it can speed up overall  
testing. Linux, MIPv6 and SHIM6 were installed on one machine and then 
this machine was replicated three times to generate other required nodes. 
The details of these machines are described in following table ( Table 5-2) 
and detail network diagram in il lustrated in the Figure 5.7. 
 
Network 
Entity  OS 
Number of  
NIC Network Pref ix  
HA Linux kernel  2 .6.23-rc3 1 2001:660:4701:1  
MN Linux kernel  2 .6.23-rc3 3 2001:660:4701:3  
      2001:660:4701:4  
      2001:660:4701:5  
CN Linux kernel  2 .6.23-rc3 2 2001:660:4701:10  
      2001:660:4701:11  
Router  Linux kernel  2 .6.23-rc3 6 2001:660:4701:1  
      2001:660:4701:3  
      2001:660:4701:4  
      2001:660:4701:5  
      2001:660:4701:10  
      2001:660:4701:11  
Table 5-2:  Hardware/software specif icat ions  
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In this figure there are four network entitles, three acting a nodes and one 
acting a router to interconnect different network prefixes.  
In the actual testing MN was requesting a video stream from CN. Both MN 
and CN were multi -interfaced and were supporting SHIM6 protoco l along 
with modified Reap protocol. MN was streaming video from CN.  
After initial  communication, SHIM6 context is established with CN by 
exchange of I1, R1, I2 and R2 messages. Once the context is established, 
CN is aware of MNs‟ multiple locators.  
 
 
Figure 5 .7:  VMware Testbed 
 
Now for MN, it  has six paths to communicate with CN. One of these paths 
is selected for communication. By default,  it  would use the path that was 
used to initial contact as its primary path. Consider a situation where there 
is a failure on this path.  Normally in this case, there would be 
communication disruption. MN detects this failure when communication is 
disrupted but with proposed scheme, this failure would be detected with 
REAP protocol.  
For simulating a failure an active interface (on which actual data was 
transmitted and received) of MN was forced to non -operational state.  
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Once failure is detected by modified REAP protocol running on CN, it 
starts sending probe messages ind icating to MN that i t  is not receiving any 
traffic. These probe messages are sent through a different access network 
and using a different CoA. When MN receives this probe message, it  
replies with probe message of its own and thus a working address pair is  
explored. This working pair is set as new address pair for communication. 
SHIM6 sub layer in MN maps the ULIDs to this address pair and adds 
receiver (CN‟s) context tag to the packets. This way address change is 
kept transparent to ULPs.  
5.5.2  Results  
During experimentation on testbed, traffic throughput, traffic disruption 
time, and packet loss were logged by wireshark for two scenarios: one 
with modified REAP enabled and the other with modified REAP disabled 
and the results were compared.  
The log file contains timestamps and the actual packet header. There are 
other network sniffers available, but Wireshark was selected because this 
is the only tool that supports real -time network capture and display.  
Traffic Disruption Analysis  
We obtained results for average disruption time for traffic. There were ten 
trial runs and the results of modified REAP and simple MIPv6 failure 
detection and recovery procedures were compared in Figure 5.8.  From the 
results it  can be concluded that the disruption time experienced by traffic 
during failures is significantly reduced when modified REAP is employed. 
The average disruption time for MIPv6 is around 1.5 seconds where as for 
modified REAP its around 800 msecs.  
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Figure 5 .8:  Disruption Time 
Traffic Throughput Analysis  
Next, we compare the traffic throughput. This is the traffic throughput at 
CN when communicating with MN. The comparison is presented in Figure 
5.9. 
The results show that the effect of failure on throughput is much  more 
visible in the MIPv6 case than in modified REAP. The traffic flow is 
much more smooth for when modified REAP is employed.  
It  can be concluded that during switching failure detection and recovery is 
much quicker when modified REAP is employed.  This i s significant as for 
most applications, session continuity is guaranteed. This also guarantees 
reliable communication.  
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Figure 5 .9:  Throughout vs.  Time  
 
Figure 5 .10:  Packet Loss  
Packet Loss Analysis  
Using the same setup, we ran some tests to calculate the packet loss 
during the switch.   Figure 5.10 gives the plot.  The packet loss is plotted 
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for ten trial runs. Again, the result  shows how modified REAP 
outperforms MIPv6 failure detection and recovery.  
 
 
5.6 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, a SHIM6 based scheme to detect communication path 
failure in MIPv6 environment is introduced. The failure detection was 
based on expiry of “send time out” and then recovery was performed by 
switching to another active interface. This switching is transparent to 
applications.  The main advantage of this is when failure through one 
interface occurs communication can switch to another interface without 
affecting most of the on-going sessions.  
By introducing REAP based path failure detection scheme to mobile 
communication can greatly improve user experience in case of multiple 
Network interface. During experimentation, the path failure in case of 
multiple interface were detected within 800ms and, and 80% of recoveries 
took just 860ms. This recovery time is about half a second and most of 
today‟s applications are resilient to such a delay. Some applications like 
VoIP and Video conferencing have very little chanc e of surviving such a 
delay.  
The testbed was developed in a wired environment where prediction of 
link failure is next to impossible. For wired environment, REAP have to 
detect failure which takes minimum of 500ms because of the “send time 
out” timer. Once the failure is detected, the recovery procedures can start 
by exploring a “working pair”  
In case of wireless networks, prediction of link failure is possible. For 
example, the Received Signal Strength (RSS), which is usually translated 
to Signal to Noise  Ratio (SNR), can provide a good prediction. If RSS 
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value is close to the threshold, then it  means that there is very good 
chance that this particular link will  fail pretty soon.  Rather than waiting 
for l ink failure to occur, if the exploration of new “wo rking pair” is 
started before actual link failure the service disruption can be reduced to 
about 5-10ms. This approach could lead to virtually seamless interface 
switching.  
One disadvantage of this SHIM6 based approach is that both CN and MN 
have to run another protocol stack which mean extra processing load. 
Another disadvantage is that MN will  have to keep all  interfaces active all 
the time.  
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Chapter 6 
 
 
 
6  Conclusion and Future Works 
 
This chapter highlights the research contributions presented in this thesis. 
Future work in this area is also described in the last section of this 
chapter.  
6.1 Concluding Remarks 
This thesis studies the reliability of mobility support in IP based network. 
For mobility support in IP networks, MIPv6 is considered a standard. This 
mobility protocol suffers from two issues: first,  the reliability of HA and 
second, Home Agent load sharing. I n research community, a few schemes 
are proposed to address these issues. These schemes were analyzed and i t  
is concluded that they fell short on some important aspect .  We propose  a 
new HA reliability architecture.  The existing reliability schemes introduce 
redundant HAs in the network.   In our proposed mechanism we eliminate 
do not introduce any redundant HAs.  MN is simultaneously registered 
with two HAs through the new HA registration scheme.  A new HA failure 
detection scheme is also introduced. It involves introduction of L2 frames.  
Higher layer information is embedded in these L2 frames.  Hence detailed 
information can be conveyed without introducing significant load on the 
network .  Failures are detected through this scheme in less than 40ms.  
Three possible load sharing schemes are also evaluated in the thesis.  
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Finally, our proposed failure detection and load sharing schemes are 
compared with existing solutions.   
Chapter 3 ,  presents a framework for HA Management based on concept of 
Autonomic computing. By introducing this  concepts, HA systems are able 
to monitor themselves and perform self -healing and self-optimization. 
There are three modules involved in the  proposed solution. Two of them 
are pure software implementations, which are not developed due  to lack of 
expertise in the field. Third module was simulated in NS2 and different 
aspects of the scheme were analyzed.  L2 frames are used to transport 
monitoring data . Main advantage of using L2 frames is that  more 
information can be carried without generating excessive traffic on the 
network. At the end of the chapter ,  this framework is extended to other 
network application/services. Overall this approach should increase 
reliability of seamless mobility in heterogeneous network as it  increases 
the reliability of HA and it tries to maintain it  in optimal state . 
For seamless mobility, handovers are the biggest obstacles. In Chapter 4 ,  
a mechanism for handovers in WiFi networks is presented. This 
mechanism is based on FMIPv6 but as FMIPv6 is  not in full  compliance 
with MIPv6 RFC some modifications were incorporated. As  part of FP6 
project ENABLE ,  author was responsible for modifying and 
demonstrating a working testbed of FMIPv6 that is in compliance with  
MIPv6 RFC. Actual testbed was presented in final demo nstration meeting 
of the project.  This was the first  ever  implementation of RFC compliant  
FMIPv6 protocol. Aim of building the testbed was to analyze the effect of 
added security procedures on overall  FMIPv6 protocol. After extensive 
testing, it  was concluded that there is  no significant difference between 
handover times of non-secure FMIPv6 and secure FMIPv6.  In addition to 
this,  an improved handover anticipation scheme was presented in the 
chapter to assist  FMIPv6. This anticipation is based on prediction of MN 
trajectory. Under certain test conditions, the success rate of handovers in 
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standard FMIPv6 ranges from 30% to 35%. With the proposed scheme, 
this rate is increased upto 60%.  
In Chapter 5 ,  author has presented a scheme by which MIPv6 enable 
Mobile Node can utilize its multiple interfaces  to seamlessly switch 
between different networks . Based on modified  REAP protocol, it  is 
possible to detect communication path failure in MIPv6 environment. In 
case of a failure , author presents a recovery scheme by switching to 
different  active interface. This switching is transparent to applications.   
The main advantage of this is  when failure through one interface occurs, 
communication can switch to another interface without affecting on -going 
sessions. 
6.2 Future Research Direction 
To further enrich the research work p resented in this thesis, the following 
suggested research directions could be pursued in future.  
 Transparent switching of HA without increasing network overheads. 
HA reliability is  still  outstanding issue. The IETF working group 
“MEXT”  is responsible for standardizing HA redundancy. In their 
charter,  transparent HA switching is stil l  l isted as an un-resolved 
issue. 
 Concept of autonomic computing and networking requires 
standardization. There is plenty of work already done on 
standardization but still  some of work needs to be done especially 
towards defining a homogeneous policy. 
 FIMPv6 only works in WiFi networks. It  can be extended to 
heterogeneous network.  
  Another aspect of FMIPv6 where further research is required is 
Candidate Access Router selection procedure. Scanning phase takes 
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too much time. There could be a further reduction in handover 
latency if we can reduce or fully eliminate this scanning time. 
Options are to either use 802.21 information server or Autonomic 
Networks resource database.  
 Multi-homing in core networks is not a new concept but in case of 
mobile environment it  has emerged recently . These days multi -radio 
interface PDAs, Laptops and even Smart phones are common site . In 
our proposed architecture, only one interface is active at a given 
time. There is a possibility to use multiple interfaces at the same 
time. For example, using WiFi for streaming video and WiMax for 
VoIP. Interface selection on its own is a research area.  
 The possibility of using link layer triggers to initiate “interf ace 
switching” procedures in a multi-homing scenario needs further 
research. For example if MN has two active interface s and received 
signal strength on one interface is very close to threshold, MN 
should switch to  the other active interface because there is a good 
chance that MN will  soon lose its connectivity. 
 
Bibliography 
_____________________________________________________________  
166 
 
Bibliography 
 
[1]    Khan, S. ,  Khan,  S. ,  Mahmud, S.A. and YAO, W. 2006 Supplementary 
Interworking Architecture for Hybrid Data Networks (UMTS -WiMAX). 
In Proceedings of Wireless World Research Forum 16th, shanghai china  
[2]    Khan, S.,  Khan, S.,  Mahmud, S.A . and Al-Raweshidy,  H. 2006.  
Supplementary Interworking Architecture for Hybrid Data Networks 
(UMTS-WiMAX). In Proceedings of the International  Multi -Conference 
on Computing in the Global  Information Technology, Anonymous IEEE 
Computer Society Washington,  DC, USA,  
[3]    Enabling Efficient and operational  Mobil i ty in Large Heterogeneous IP 
Network. ht tp: //www.ist -enable.org/  
[4]    Perkins,  C. ,  “IP Mobili ty Support,” IETF -RFC (Proposed Standard) 
3344, August 2002.  
[5]    Perkins,  C. ,  Johnson, D. and Arkko,  J. ,  “Mobili ty Support in IPv6,” 
IETF Draft ,  draft - ietf-mobileip-ipv6-24 (work in progress),  August  
2003 
[6]    Perkins,  C. ,  Johnson,  D.,  and Arkko J. ,  “Mobili ty Support  in IPv6,” 
IETF-RFC (Proposed Standard) 3775, June 2004.  
[7]    Chambless,  B.  and J.  Binkley,  “HA Redundancy Protocol,” IETF Draft,  
draftchambless-mobileip-harp-00.txt  (work in progress ),  October 1997.  
[8]    Ghosh,  R.  and G. Varghese,  “Fault  Tolerant  Mobile IP,” Washington 
University,Technical Report (WUCS-98-11),  1998.  
[9]    Ahn, J.  and C.S.  Hwang, “Efficient  Fault -Tolerant  Protocol for 
Mobili ty Agents in Mobile IP,” in Proc.  15th Int‟l  Parallel  an d 
Distributed Processing Symp.,  pp. 1273 -1280, 2001.  
[10]    Leung, K. and M. Subbarao, “HA Redundancy in Mobile IP,” IETF 
Draft ,  draftsubbarao-mobileip-redundancy-00.txt (work in progress),  
June 2001.  
[11]    Wakikawa, R.,  Devarapall i ,  V. AND Thubert ,  P.  2004. Inter home 
agents protocol (HAHA). draft -wakikawa-mip6-nemo-haha-01.txt) ,  
Internet  Draft ,  IETF 
Bibliography 
_____________________________________________________________  
167 
 
[12]    Faizan,  J . ,  El-Rewini,  H. AND Kaali l ,  M. 2005.  VHARP: Virtual  home 
agent rel iabili ty protocol for mobile IPv6 based networks. Wireless 
Networks, Communications,  and Mobil e Computing.  
[13]    R. Hinden “Virtual  Router Redundancy Protocol for IPv6”,  draft - ietf-
vrrp-ipv6-spec-08 February 23, 2007”.  
[14]    R. Wakikawa, “Home Agent Reliabili ty Protocol”,  draft -ietf-mip6-
hareliabili ty-02.txt (work in progress),  July 2007  
[15]    Jue,  J .  and D. Ghosal ,  “Design and Analysis of a Replicated Server 
Architecture for Supporting IP-Host Mobili ty,” Cluster Computing 
Special  Issue on Mobile Computing,  vol.  1,  issue 2,  pp.  249 -260.  
[16]    Vasilache, J . ,  and H. Kameda,  “Threshold -Based Load Balancing for 
Multiple HAs in  Mobile IP Networks,” Telecommunications Systems,  
vol.  22,  issue 1-4, pp. 11- 31, January-April ,  2003.  
[17]    Heissenhuber,  F. ,  Fritsche, W., and A. Riedl,  “HA Redundancy and 
Load Balancing in Mobile IPv6,” in Proc. 5th International Conf.  
Broadband  Communications,Hong Kong, 1999.  
[18]    Narten,  T.,  Nordmark,  E.  and W. Simpson, “Neighbor Discovery for IP 
Version 6 (IPv6),” RFC 2461, December 1998. Deering, S.  and R. 
Hinden,  “Internet  Protocol,  Version 6 (IPv6) Specification,”IETF -  RFC 
2460, December 1998 
[19]    Hinden,  R. and S. Deering,  “IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture,” 
RFC 2373, July 1998.  
[20]    Kent,  S.  and R. Atkinson,  “IP Authentication Header,” RFC 2402, 
November 1998 
[21]    Kent,  S.  and R. Atkinson,  “IP Encapsulating Security  Payload (ESP),” 
RFC 2406, November 1998 
[22]    Deng, H.,  Zhang,  R. ,  Huang, X. and K. Zhang, “Load Balance for 
Distr ibuted HAsin Mobile IPv6,” IETF Draft ,  draft -deng-mip6-ha-
loadbalance-00.txt  (work in progress),  November 2003 . 
[23]    Droms,  R.,  “Dynamic Host  Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6),” 
draft- ietfdhc-dhcpv6-28 (work in progress),  November 2002.  
[24]    CASE, J. ,  FEDOR, M., SCHOFFSTALL, M. AND DAVIN, J.  Simple 
network management protocol (SNMP).  
Bibliography 
_____________________________________________________________  
168 
 
[25]    FU, Z.H.L.J.W.W.M. AND ZHONG, Y.P.  A Novel WSDM -based 
Content  Service Status Monitoring Scheme in Content  Federation 
Architecture.  
[26]    PULTORAK, D. Microsoft  Operations Framework (MOF). The Guide to 
IT-Service Management 1,  190-203. 
[27]    KEPHART, J. ,  CHESS, D.,  CENTER, I .B.M.T.J.W.R. AND 
HAWTHORNE, N. 2003.  The vision of autonomic computing.  Computer 
36,  41-50. 
[28]    DOBSON, S. ,  DENAZIS, S.,  FERNÁNDEZ, A.,  GAÏTI,  D.,  GELENBE, 
E. ,  MASSACCI, F.,  NIXON, P. ,  SAFFRE, F.,  SCHMIDT, N. AND 
ZAMBONELLI,  F.  2006.  A survey of autonomic communications.  ACM 
Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems (TAAS) 1, 223 -
259. 
[29]    GU, X.,  STRASSNER, J. ,  XIE, J . ,  W OLF, L.  AND SUDA, T.  2008. 
Autonomic Multimedia Communications:  Where Are We Now? 
Proceedings of the IEEE 96, 143-154. 
[30]    Agarwala,  S. ,  Chen,  Y.,  Milojicic,  D.,  and Schwan, K. 2006.  QMON: 
QoS- and Utili tyaware monitoring in enterprise systems.  In Proceedings 
of the 3rd IEEE International Conference on Autonomic Computing 
(ICAC). Dublin,  Ireland.  
[31]    Agrawal,  D.,  Calo,  S. ,  Giles,  J . ,  Lee,  K. -W.,  and Verma, D. 2005. 
Policy management for networked systems and applications.  In 
Proceedings of the 9th IFIP/IEEE Interna tional  Symposium on 
Integrated Network Management.  455 –468. 
[32]    Bennani,  M. N. and Menasce, D. A. 2005.  Resource al location for 
autonomic data centers using analytic performance models.  In 
Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Autonomic 
Computing (ICAC).  229–240. 
[33]    Bhola,  S. ,  Astley,  M.,  Saccone, R. ,  and Ward,  M. 2006.  Uti l i ty -aware 
resource allocation in an event processing system. In Proceedings of 
3rd IEEE International  Conference on Autonomic Computing (ICAC). 
Dublin,  Ireland, 55–64. 
Bibliography 
_____________________________________________________________  
169 
 
[34]    Candea,  G.,  Kiciman, E.,  Zhang,  S.,  Keyani,  P. ,  and Fox,  A. 2003. 
JAGR: An autonomous self -recovering application server.  In 
Proceedings of the Autonomic Computing Workshop. 168 –177. 
[35]    Garlan,  D. and Schmerl ,  B.  2002a.  Exploit ing architectural design 
knowledge to support selfrepairing systems.  In Proceedings of the 14th 
international  conference on Software engineering and knowledge 
engineering.  
[36]    Guo, H. 2003.  A bayesian approach for autonomic algorithm selection. 
In Proceedings of the IJCAI workshop on AI and autonomi c computing: 
developing a research agenda for selfmanaging computer systems.  
Acapulco,  Mexico.  
[37]    Littman, M.,  Nguyen,  T. ,  and Hirsh,  H. 2003.  A model of cost -sensitive 
fault  mediation.  In Proceedings of the IJCAI workshop on AI and 
autonomic computing: developing a research 
[38]    agenda for self -managing computer systems.  Acapulco, Mexico.  
[39]    Lymberopoulos,  L.,  Lupu, E. ,  and Sloman, M. 2003.  An adaptive 
policy-based framework for network services management.  In Journal  
of Network and Systems Management.  Vol.  11.  Speci al Issue on Policy-
based Management.  
[40]    Strowes,  S. ,  Badr,  N.,  Dulay,  N.,  Heeps,  S.,  Lupu, E. ,  Sloman, M., and 
Sventek,  J.  2006.  An Event Service Supporting Autonomic Management 
of Ubiquitous Systems for e -Health.  In  
[41]    Proceedings of Intl .  Workshop on Distributed Event -Based Systems.  
[42]    R. Koodli ,  Ed,  “Fast  Handovers for Mobile IPv6,” IETF -RFC (Proposed 
Standard) 4068, August 2005.  
[43]    Ivov,  E.  AND Noel,  T.  2006. An Experimental Performance Evaluation 
of the IETF FMIPv6 Protocol over IEEE 802.11 WLANs. In 
Proceedings of the IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking 
Conference (WCNC’06, Anonymous ,  568–574. 
[44]    Kempf,  J . ,  Wood, J .  AND FU, G. 2003. Fast mobile IPv6 handover 
packet  loss performance:  measurement for emulated real  t ime traffic.  
2003 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking,  2003.WCNC 
2003 2, 
Bibliography 
_____________________________________________________________  
170 
 
[45]    Pack,  S.  AND ChoiI,  Y. 2003.  Performance analysis of fast  handover in 
mobile IPv6 networks.  Lecture notes in computer science 679-691. 
[46]    Koodi,  R. AND Perkins,  C.E.  2001.  Fast  handovers and context  
transfers in mobile networks.  ACM SIGCOMM Computer 
Communication Review 31, 37-47 
[47]    Hangino, J.  AND Snyder ,  H. 2001.  IPv6 multihoming support  at  si te 
exit  routers.  Request  for Comments 3178,  
[48]    Johnson,  D. AND Deering,  S.  Reserved IPv6 subnet anycast  addresses,  
IETF RFC 2526,  March 1999.  
[49]    Nikander ,  P. ,  Arkko, J .  AND Henderson, T.  2004.  End-Host  Mobility 
and Multi -Homing with Host  Identity  Protocol.  draft- iet f -hip-mm-00 
(work in progress)  
[50]    Huston,  G.,  Wasserman,  M.,  “A Summary of Proposals to Support  
Multihoming for IPv6”,  IETF Internet Draft  draft -huston-multi6-
proposals-00.txt,  June 2004.  
[51]    Huitema,  C.,  Draves,  R. ,  “Host-Centric IPv6 Multihoming”,  IETF 
Internet  Draft  draft -huitema-multi6-hosts-01.txt ,  June 2002(Work in  
progress)  
[52]    Teraoka,  F. ,  Ishiyama, M.,  Kunshi,  M.,  and Shionozaki,  A.,   “LIN6: A 
Solution to Mobil ity  and Multi -Homing in IPv6”,  IETF Internet  Draft 
draft- teraoka-ipng-lin6-01.txt,  August 2001 
[53]    Mike O‟Dell ,  “ 8+8 -An Alternate Addressing Architecture for IP v6”, 
IETF Internet Draft,  draft -odell-8+8-00.txt  
[54]    Stewart,  R.,  “Stream Control  Transmission Protocol”,  IETF RFC 2960, 
October 2000 
[55]    Dunmore, M. 2005.  Evaluation of  Mult ihoming Solutions  
[56]    Ohta,  M.,  “The Architecture of End to End Multihoming”,  IETF 
Internet  Draft  draft -ohta-e2e-multihoming-02.txt,  July 2001 
[57]    Bragg,  N.,  “Routing Support  for IPv6 Multi -homing”,  IETF Internet 
Draft  draft-bragg-ipv6-multihoming-00.txt ,  November 2000 
[58]    Bates,  T.,  Rekhter,  Y. ,  “Scalable Support  for Multihomed Multi -
provider Connectivity”,  IETF RFC 2260, January 1998  
Bibliography 
_____________________________________________________________  
171 
 
[59]    Nordmark, E. ,  Bagnulo,  M.,  “Shim6: Level  3 Multihoming Shim 
Protocol for IPv6”,  IETF Internet  Draft  draft - ietf-shim6-proto-12.txt,  
February 2009.  
[60]    Crawford,  M.,  “Router Renumbering for IPv6”,  IETF RFC 2894, August     
2000 
[61]    Aura,  T. ,  “Cryptographically Generated Addresses”,  IETF RFC 3972, 
March 2005 
[62]    Bagnulo,  M.,  “Hash based Addresses”,  IETF Internet  Draft  draft - ietf-
shim6-hba-04,  October 2007 
[63]    Rosenberg,  J . ,  Schulzrinne,  H.,  Camaril lo,  G.,  Johnston,  A.,  Peterson,  
J . ,  Sparks,  R. ,  Handley,  M.,  and Schooler,  E.,  “Session Initiat ion 
Protocol”,  IETF RFC 3261, June 2002  
[64]    Ylitalo,  J . ,  Torvinen,  V.,  Nordmark,  E. ,  "Weak Identif ier  Multihoming 
Protocol Framework (WIMP-F)" IETF Internet  Draft  draft -yli talo-
multi6-wimp-01,  June 2004 
[65]    Nordmark, E.  “Multihoming without IP Identif iers”,  IETF Internet 
Draft  draft-nordmark-multi6-noid-01.txt,  October 2003.  
[66]     “Carrier  Grade Voice over IP” Daniel  Collins -  McGraw-Hill  
Education  
[67]    Qazi Bouland Mussabbir,  Wenbing Yao, Zeyun Niu,  and Xiaoming Fu 
“Optimized FMIPv6 Handover using IEEE 802.21 MIH Services,” 
MobiArch, ACM, 2006 
[68]    Camp, T. ,  Boleng,  J . ,  & Davies,  V. (2002).  A survey of mobil ity 
models for ad hoc network research.Wireless Communications and 
Mobile Computing,  2 (5),  483–502. 
